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Chapter 13

HARMONIZING CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Daniel M. Firger* and Michael B. Gerrard**

Introduction
In response to the threat posed by climate change, States are adopting a variety of
national and transnational regulatory measures aimed at restricting the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. Unfortunately, many of these measures
appear to conflict with core principles of the legal regime governing international
investment. Along with longstanding concerns about the “fragmentation” of international
law,1 scholars and practitioners alike have begun to examine, more specifically, perceived
incompatibilities between new climate change regulations and the obligations imposed on
States by international investment law (IIL).2 Conflict is inevitable, they maintain,
* Postdoctoral Research Scholar, Columbia Law School; J.D., NYU School of Law; M.P.A., Woodrow
Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University. The author wishes to thank two
anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments.
** Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia Law School.
1

See International Law Commission, “Report of the study group on the fragmentation of international law:
held at Geneva, Switzerland, from 29 April to 7 June and 22 July to 16 August 2002,” A/CN.4/L.682,
available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm (last visited April 27, 2011). For an analysis of
fragmentation focusing specifically on IIL, see Anne Van Aaken, “Fragmentation of international law: the
case of international investment protection,” 17 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 91 (2008).
2
See Kate Miles, “Arbitrating climate change: Regulatory regimes and investor-state disputes,” 1 Climate
Law 63 (2010), pp. 86-91; Fiona Marshall, “Climate change and international investment agreements:
Obstacles or opportunities,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, Trade, Investment and
Climate Change Series (March 2010), available at:
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_iias.pdf (last visited May 3, 2011); Lise Johnson,
“International investment agreements and climate change: The potential for investor-state conflicts and
possible strategies for minimizing it,” 39 Environmental Law Reporter 11147 (2009); Albert H. Cho and
Navroz K. Dubash, “Will investment rules shrink policy space for sustainable development? Evidence from
the electricity sector,” World Resources Institute Working Paper No. 16 (September 5, 2003). For a more
general treatment of the relationship between environmental norms and the IIL regime, see Jorge Viñuales,
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because of the “self-contained” nature of single-purpose international legal regimes such
as those meant to safeguard the environment or protect foreign investments.3 Since
measures taken pursuant to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) tend to impose new costs on the consumption of high-carbon fuels,
observers worry that foreign investors in energy intensive industries will make use of
provisions in international investment agreements (IIAs) to challenge those regulations
which negatively impact their investments’ profitability. A raft of new investor claims,
some fear, may force States to choose between conflicting international law obligations,
stymieing efforts to curb climate change while fostering sustainable development.4
Indeed, a few savvy investors have already initiated or threatened climate-related
claims, building upon a series of recent challenges to other types of host country
environmental regulation.5 In a 2009 dispute that illustrates the potential incompatibility
“Foreign investment and the environment in international law: An ambiguous relationship,” 80 British
Yearbook of International Law 244 (2009).
3
The seminal piece on this topic is Bruno Simma, “Self-contained regimes,” 16 Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law 111 (1985). Building upon Simma’s work, many scholars have identified conflicts
between climate policy and trade law. See, e.g., Christina Voight, Sustainable development as a principle
of international law: resolving conflicts between climate measures and WTO law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2008), pp. 195-202. Indeed, the WTO itself has published a report on the subject, noting areas
of conflict between the trade and climate change regimes but also emphasizing the potential for positive
linkages. World Trade Organization, “Trade and climate change: a report by the United Nations
Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization, ” (2009), available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/trade_climate_change_e.htm (last visited April 27, 2011).
Some have also identified the potential for conflict between IIL and other international legal regimes,
including human rights law. See Van Aaken, “Fragmentation of international law: The case of international
investment protection,” supra note 1 (discussing the potential incompatibility of investment law with
human rights law, EU law, and WTO law). Although building upon the “fragmentation” literature, this
chapter is more limited in scope, focusing exclusively on the relationship between IIL and climate policy.
4
See Miles, “Arbitrating climate change: regulatory regimes and investor-state disputes,” supra note 2;
Johnson, “International investment agreements and climate change: The potential for investor-state
conflicts and possible strategies for minimizing it,” supra note 2. See also Jacob Werksman, Kevin A.
Baumert and Navroz K. Dubash, “Will international investment rules obstruct climate protection policies?
An examination of the clean development mechanism,” 3 International Environmental Agreements:
Politics, Law and Economics 59 (2003). The climate measures discussed in this chapter may conflict with
investment norms in one of two ways. First, a climate measure may arise out of an international
environmental law obligation, as under the UNFCCC, that is incompatible with an IIL obligation. Second, a
climate measure may be based on entirely domestic environmental considerations rather than international
environmental law, yet still conflict with obligations imposed by IIL. To clarify this distinction, it is useful
to think of the first type of inconsistency as a “normative conflict,” and the second type as a “legitimacy
conflict.” Jorge Viñuales and Magnus Langer, “Managing conflicts between environmental and investment
norms in international law,” in Y. Kerbrat and S. Maljean-Dubois, eds., International law faced with
environmental challenges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming) (introducing the distinction and applying
it to the resolution of conflicts of law in investment disputes based upon challenges to environmental
regulation), manuscript available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683465 (last visited June 3, 2011). Although
there is some evidence that arbitral tribunals may use different interpretive tools when resolving normative
versus legitimacy conflicts, id. at pp. 7-11, this chapter addresses both types of disputes interchangeably.
This is because national and international climate change policy is not determined exclusively, or even
primarily, by the UNFCCC regime, but rather by a diffuse “regime complex.” See Keohane and Victor,
“The regime complex for climate change,” infra note 18 and related text.
5
See, e.g., Chemtura Corp v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal, award (August
2, 2010) (phase-out of toxic pesticide for public health reasons); Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of
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of climate policy and IIL, a foreign investor challenged the requirement by German
regulators that the investor install costly GHG emissions controls on a proposed coalfired power plant, alleging violations of the Energy Charter Treaty’s chapter on
investment protection.6 Relatedly, in response to Australia’s proposed cap-and-trade law,
at least one foreign investor threatened to file an expropriation claim under the AustraliaHong Kong bilateral investment treaty (BIT) unless the legislation included generous
compensation terms to recoup expected losses to the investor’s holdings in several dirty
coal facilities.7 And in Europe, a foreign investor warned that it would bring a similar
expropriation claim against Austria if the government carried through with
implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).8 Although
none of these disputes have yet reached an arbitral tribunal, the exploitation of IIL to
curtail the clean energy agenda seems likely to persist – and intensify – as national and
international climate change regulation continues apace.
Yet IIL and climate policy are less at odds than they appear. Recent trends in both
regimes point towards harmonization and coordination, not incongruity and conflict. On
America, NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal, award (May 16, 2009) (environmental regulations
associated with an open-pit mine); Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/22, award (July 24, 2008) (performance requirements imposed on urban water and sewer
project); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, decision on
annulment (February 16, 2007) (environmental and land use regulations associated with a residential
construction project); Methanex v. United States of America, NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal, award
(August 3, 2005) (regulation of gasoline additive); Waste Management v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3, award (April 30, 2004) (local environmental regulations); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal, partial award (November 13, 2000) (public health regulations
associated with toxic waste disposal); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, award (Aug. 30, 2000) (public health regulation associated with waste disposal);
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, final award
(February 17, 2000) (protection of wetlands and biodiversity).
6
Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, request for arbitration (March 30, 2009) (settled August 2010).
7
Peter Smith, “Canberra faces legal challenge over carbon scheme,” Financial Times, November 24, 2009.
8
Manfred Schekulin, note, on file with author. Of course, IIL can serve as a sword as well as a shield in
climate policy battles; in the same way that fossil fuel investors have threatened to challenge environmental
regulations, clean energy investors might make use of BIT provisions to protest the non-enforcement of
climate-friendly measures. For a recent example, see Elizabeth Whitsitt, “Claimant seeks enforcement of
environmental laws in notice of dispute alleging expropriation of Barbadian nature sanctuary,” Investment
Treaty News, February 14, 2010, p. 4 (describing Peter A. Allard v. Government of Barbados (pending), in
which a foreign investor attempted to make novel use of the provisions of the Barbados-Canada BIT in
order to challenge the non-enforcement of a host country’s environmental laws). The full text of the
claimant’s notice of dispute is available at http://graemehall.com/legal/papers/BIT-Complaint.pdf (last
visited April 29, 2011). Another example, the first dispute to be arbitrated under the Permanent Court of
Arbitration’s (PCA’s) “Optional rules for arbitration of disputes relating to natural resources and/or the
environment,” involved a Cypriot investor’s claim against Ukraine’s National Environmental Investment
Agency alleging that its investment in a natural gas efficiency project had been expropriated. If completed,
the project – designed to generate tradable Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) under the Kyoto Protocol, see
infra note 194 and accompanying text – would have yielded returns for the investor as well as the
Ukrainian government. In a decision dated July 27, 2010, the arbitral tribunal rejected claimant’s request
for interim measures. See Luke Eric Peterson, “Tribunal declines interim measures request of investor;
claimant pursuing arbitration arising out of Kyoto Protocol emission reduction project,” Investment
Arbitration Reporter, October 20, 2010, available at: http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20101023_3 (last
visited May 3, 2011).
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the one hand, international climate negotiations and domestic legislative debates are
increasingly emphasizing the importance of financial and technical support for mitigation
and adaptation by developing countries. Both the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the
Cancún Agreements of 2010, for instance, call on developed countries to mobilize a total
of US$ 30 billion in “fast start” financing for the period from 2010-2012 and set a goal of
US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 for such efforts.9 To meet these goals, the UN
Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF)
concluded that developed countries must facilitate both public and private investment
flows to developing countries.10 Beyond climate finance, developed country governments
are making additional commitments to transfer clean energy technologies to less
developed countries. These types of undertakings seem less likely to necessitate the sort
of command-and-control regulations that can conflict with investment treaty obligations.
Their success instead will depend, as in the case of foreign investment more generally,
upon the establishment of a “clear, stable and predictable policy framework” to
incentivize low-carbon foreign direct investment (FDI).11 This is something that can, and
should, be readily provided by the international investment law regime.
On the other hand, the increasingly multidirectional character of global
investment flows is breaking down traditional distinctions between capital importers and
exporters, leading many governments to reexamine their policies in order to strike a
better balance between ensuring the security of FDI outflows and promoting beneficial
inflows of foreign capital. A decade ago developed countries largely understood
themselves to be in the business of protecting their nationals’ overseas investments.
Today, officials in Brussels, Ottawa, Tokyo and Washington are more likely to embrace
the perspectives of host countries as they seek to attract foreign investment while
retaining flexibility in setting domestic policies that might affect the rights of foreign
investors.12 This give-and-take is reflected in changes to the language of the IIAs these
9

UNFCCC decision 2/CP.15 (December 18, 2009) paras. 5, 8 (April 23, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen
Accord], available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf (last visited April 29,
2011). The set of texts agreed to in December 2010 at COP-16, known collectively as the Cancún
Agreements, effectively ratified the financing framework laid out by parties in Copenhagen. UNFCCC
draft decision 1/CP.16 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Cancún Agreements], available at:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 (last visited April 29, 2011). Whether
the pledges made at COP-16 will actually be forthcoming is very much an open question. In the United
States, four Republican Senators publicly called on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to freeze all future
spending related to international climate finance, calling into question the Obama administration’s ability to
meet its Copenhagen and Cancún commitments. See Darren Samuelsohn, “U.S. climate cash pledge in
doubt,” Politico.com, December 10, 2010, available at:
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46222.html (last visited April 29, 2011). The Senators’ letter to
Secretary Clinton is available at: http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/energy/clintonletter.pdf (last
visited April 29, 2011).
10
United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change
Financing,” (November 5, 2010), available at:
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/financeadvisorygroup/pid/13300 (last visited
April 29, 2011). For further discussion of the AGF, see infra notes 231-232.
11
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a low-carbon economy, Sales No. E.10.II.D.2
(New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2010), p. xxvii.
12
Canada, for example, announced in November 2010 that it would amend its foreign investment law, R.S.,
1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), available at: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk51018.html (last visited
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governments conclude with other countries; recent agreements impose far less draconian
obligations on host countries and contain far more exceptions and carve outs than
agreements concluded just several years earlier.13 Additionally, new initiatives such as
the European Commission’s (EC’s) proposed regulation on foreign investment – which
outlines how and when the European Union will replace existing BITs concluded by
Member States with new treaties negotiated by the EC itself – include provisions on the
environment and human rights and emphasize the importance of host country and home
country responsibility in this regard.14 Thus, rather than signaling the inevitability of
conflict, trends in both climate policy and IIL indicate that these disciplines are entering a
new phase characterized by coordination, harmonization, and mutual learning. This
chapter will map this new terrain and identify key opportunities to productively shape the
interaction between climate change policy and international investment law.
The chapter proceeds in five parts. Parts A and B outline the main features of the
climate change and IIL regimes, respectively. Part C highlights recent investment
oriented trends in climate policy, paying particular attention to those commitments and
actions by states that will most likely stimulate low-carbon FDI flows over the short- and
medium-term. Part D turns to the IIL regime, noting developments such as the
renegotiation of IIAs by both developed and developing countries to encourage
sustainable development and environmental protection. Part E concludes.
A.The Global Climate Change Policy Framework
Global climate change, which results in large measure from anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs,15 is widely acknowledged to be the
quintessential collective action problem of our time. Like other transboundary
environmental harms, climate change creates a “transnational cooperation dilemma,”
April 29, 2011), to require greater transparency and accountability from foreign investors seeking to
acquire controlling interests in domestic firms. See Bernard Simon, “Canada to toughen rules on foreign
investment,” Financial Times, November 7, 2010, available at: http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a8dd890ea68-11df-b28d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1KygVvyNT (last visited April 29, 2011).
13
See, e.g., Kenneth Vandevelde, “A comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. model BITs: Rebalancing
investor and host country interests,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on international investment law and
policy 2008-2009 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 283-315 (describing changes over a ten
year period in treaty text negotiated by the United States to expand the policy space available to host
countries).
14
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Toward a
comprehensive European international investment policy, COM(2010)343 final (available as annex to this
volume), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf (last visited:
March 28, 2011); European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member
States and third countries, COM(2010)344 final (available as annex to this volume), available at:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146308.pdf (last visited: March 29, 2011),
p. 9. These documents touch only glancingly upon the topic of potential home country obligations,
although discussions concerning this issue are ongoing in Europe and beyond. See infra note 298 and
accompanying text.
15
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Fourth assessment report: synthesis report”
(Geneva, 2007), available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html (last
visited April 29, 2011).
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since cross-border externalities render unilateral action by States largely ineffective in
solving the problem.16 And because carbon dioxide mixes uniformly throughout the
atmosphere, is emitted as a consequence of nearly all modern industrial activities and has
planetary rather than solely localized effects, the climate dilemma is particularly hard to
resolve; no State acting alone can stop the global warming process and individual States
have little incentive to reduce their own GHG emissions when other major emitters do
not.17 For these reasons, climate change calls out for a multilateral solution. Yet
notwithstanding this insight and two decades of work to craft a comprehensive
international treaty, climate policy today is characterized not by a single overarching
framework for global action, but rather a set of overlapping regulatory regimes. This Part
describes the key features of this “regime complex” for international climate policy.18
1.Multilateral Coordination: the UNFCCC
Recognizing the need for concerted action on global warming, the international
community concluded the UNFCCC at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.19 The
Convention, along with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol establishing country-specific emissions
reduction commitments for the period from 2008 through 2012, has been the primary
international mechanism for dealing with climate change ever since.20 At its core, the
UNFCCC, through its Kyoto Protocol, consists of a set of binding emission reduction
targets for developed countries; the Kyoto Protocol assigns these parties, listed in Annex
I of the Convention, “quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.”21
Overall, Annex I parties have agreed to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions by at least
5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012.22 To achieve their commitments, Annex I parties
are required to implement a variety of policies and measures, in accordance with national
circumstances. These include, inter alia, energy efficiency measures, protection of GHG
“sinks and reservoirs” such as forests, research and development on renewable energy
and carbon sequestration technologies, and the phase out of preferential tax treatment and
subsidies for carbon intensive industries.23 The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
Convention meets annually to review implementation and negotiate further
16

Scott Barrett, Environment and statecraft: The strategy of environmental treaty-making (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), p. 49.
17
Daniel Bodansky, “The United Nations framework convention on climate change: A commentary,” 18
Yale Journal of International Law 451 (1993).
18
The concept of a “regime complex for climate change” was first proposed by political scientists Robert
Keohane and David Victor in 2010. Robert Keohane and David Victor, “The regime complex for climate
change,” 9 Perspectives on Politics 7 (2011). Keohane and Victor build upon earlier work introducing the
concept of a regime complex and applying it to the issue area of plant genetic resources. Kal Raustiala and
David Victor, “The regime complex for plant genetic resources,” 58 International Organization 277
(2004).
19
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (opened for signature 20 June 1992, entered
into force 21 March 1994) (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 848 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
20
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (opened for signature
16 March 1998, entered into force 16 February 2005) (1998) 37 International Legal Materials 22
(hereinafter Kyoto Protocol).
21
Id.
22
Id., art. 3. Notably, the United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore is not legally
bound to reduce its emissions, as are most other developed countries.
23
Id., art. 2.
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commitments,24 while two permanent subsidiary bodies meet separately and advise the
COP on scientific and technical matters.25
Crucially, the Kyoto Protocol establishes a set of market-based “flexibility
mechanisms” to enable Annex I countries to meet their emissions reduction obligations
under Article 3 of the Protocol. These mechanisms include: (i) emissions trading between
Annex I parties;26 (ii) joint implementation, which allows Annex I parties to transfer
among themselves emissions reduction credits generated by low-carbon projects
undertaken in developed countries;27 and (iii) the clean development mechanism (CDM),
which authorizes Annex I parties to finance and obtain credit for emission reduction
projects in developing (non-Annex I) countries.28 Each of these three mechanisms
anticipates a role for the private sector in transnational climate mitigation activities, thus
implicating the IIL regime.29 The CDM, however, is explicitly designed to stimulate lowcarbon FDI30 and has therefore garnered the most attention from those interested in the
24

UNFCCC, Essential background: Convention bodies, available at:
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.php (last visited April 29,
2011). The sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) took place in Cancún, Mexico from November 29
to December 10, 2010, as this chapter was submitted for publication.
25
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was established by Article 9 of
the Convention, with a mandate to “provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other
subsidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the
Convention.” UNFCCC, supra note 19, Article 9. Article 10 of the Convention established the Subsidiary
Body for Implementation (SBI), which is meant to “assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment
and review of the effective implementation of the Convention.” UNFCCC, supra note 19, Article 10.
26
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, Article 17.
27
Id., Article 6.
28
Id., art. 12.
29
Emissions trading schemes authorized under the Kyoto Protocol can take a variety of forms, as Article 17
leaves to the Conference of the Parties (COP) the task of “defin[ing] the relevant principles, modalities,
rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading.”
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, Article 17. Although the details of trading schemes differ across
jurisdictions, they function by allocating emissions reduction credits to particular industries or facilities,
which are authorized in turn to sell excess permits to other entities for which the marginal cost of emissions
abatement is higher. See Nathaniel O. Keohane, “Cap-and-trade is preferable to a carbon tax,” in Richard
B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury and Bryce Rudyk, eds., Climate finance: Regulatory and funding strategies
for climate change and global development (New York: NYU Press, 2009), pp. 57-64. Needless to say,
emissions trading can take place internationally as well as within a particular country, implicating
principles of international investment (and trade) law. Likewise, joint implementation prefigures private
sector investment across borders in low-carbon projects, with Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol allowing for
such involvement. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, Article 6(3). (“A Party included in Annex I may
authorize legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer
or acquisition under this Article of emission reduction units.”) The Kyoto Protocol is even more explicit
with respect to the CDM, stating that “[p]articipation under the clean development mechanism [...]
may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by
the executive board of the clean development mechanism.” Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, Article 12(9).
See also Kati Kulovesi, “The private sector and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences,
challenges and prospects,” 16 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 145
(2007), p. 147.
30
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, Article 12(2) (“The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be
to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.”).
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interplay among climate change policy, sustainable development, and IIL.31 Part C.1
below addresses these issues in greater depth.
As atmospheric concentrations of GHGs continue to rise, the impacts of climate
change are already being felt in communities ranging from low-lying Pacific island
nations to icebound indigenous villages above the Arctic Circle.32 Responding to the
pressing need to adapt to climate change impacts while still working to mitigate GHG
emissions, parties in 2007 established a two-track negotiating system for future COPs.
Along one track, parties now work to extend Annex I emissions reduction commitments
beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s 2012 sunset, while along the other track the parties address
adaptation, financing, and other matters left unresolved by the Kyoto Protocol, such as a
framework for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD),
also discussed in Part C.1 below.33
Although arguably useful, this two-track feature of recent COPs has done little to
resolve tensions between various negotiating blocs; disagreement between blocs led to
the near-breakdown of the UNFCCC process at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) held in Copenhagen in December 2009. There, after formal talks had stalled,
ostensibly due to “procedural roadblocks” thrown up by developing countries led by
Bolivia, Sudan and Venezuela,34 a small meeting among the United States, Chinese,
Indian, Brazilian and South African heads of State, followed immediately by a somewhat
larger meeting of the major emitting countries,35 yielded a deal on the last day of the

31

For an excellent overview, see Karen Holm Olsen, “The clean development mechanism’s contribution to
sustainable development: a review of the literature,” 84 Climatic Change 59 (2007).
32
See, e.g., Islands First, Sea Level Rise, available at:
http://www.islandsfirst.org/issues/sea_level_rise.html (last visited April 29, 2011); Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th
Cir. 2010) (common law nuisance claim brought by native Arctic community against major GHG emitters).
33
The “Kyoto track,” carried out via the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), does not include the United States, rending it less than ideal
as a vehicle for negotiations on future emissions reductions. The “Convention track” was established by the
Bali Action Plan, which created the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention (AWG-LCA). See Bali Action Plan, infra note 44.
34
Daniel Bodansky, “The Copenhagen climate change conference: A post-mortem,” 104 American Journal
of International Law 230 (2010). Indeed, much of the agenda in Copenhagen was dominated by developing
country delegations, who demanded funding commitments from developed countries. See, e.g., Nairobi
declaration on the African process of combating climate change, para. 13, May 2009 (“Africa, in the
context of environmental justice, should be equitably compensated for environmental, social and economic
losses and […] requires substantially scaled-up finance, technology and capacity-building for adaptation
and risk management in accordance with the obligations of the Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to
the Convention”), available at:
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00011975:7fea6da7d6826946f975c392f881c116.
pdf (last visited April 29, 2011); Declaration of the Second Pan-African Parliamentary Network on Climate
Change Summit, October 2009 (demanding that developed countries commit at least 1.5% of global GDP
to meeting adaptation and mitigation needs), available at:
http://www.africaclimatesolution.org/features/Declaration_2nd_PAPNCC_summit.pdf (last visited April
29, 2011).
35
This grouping of countries, notably, overlapped only partially with the membership of the Major
Economies Forum. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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summit.36 The result was a non-binding political document, the Copenhagen Accord.
Somewhat unusually, the COP “took note” of the Accord rather than adopting a formal
legal treaty.37 Parties to the UNFCCC decided in Copenhagen to extend the mandate of
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) through 201038 and at the 16th Conference of the Parties
(COP-16) summit in December 2010 the parties to the UNFCCC agreed to a further
extension while putting off tough discussions on the future legal framework for climate
policy after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period in 2012.39 These
discussions were expected to continue through 2011, culminating in the 17th Conference
of the Parties (COP-17) meeting in South Africa in December of that year.
Also of note for present purposes, “developed parties”40 to the UNFCCC agreed
in 1992 to a set of financial commitments related to the mitigation and adaptation costs
expected to be incurred by developing countries. Pursuant to UNFCCC Article 4,
developed country parties will provide “new and additional” financial resources to meet
the “agreed full costs” developing country parties incur in fulfilling their reporting
commitments related to implementation.41 Developed country parties will also provide
financing “to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures” related to
developing country parties’ commitments under Article 4(1), so long as these costs are
agreed to between the developing country recipient and the donor country.42 Perhaps
36

Bodansky, “The Copenhagen climate change conference: A post-mortem,” supra note 34.
Id. The Copenhagen Accord is a legally ambiguous document. While the Accord itself is a non-binding
political statement rather than a binding international treaty, the COP “took note” of the Accord in a formal
decision, and requested that parties “associate with” the Accord in the months following the Copenhagen
climate summit. For an excellent exposition of the legal and political implications of these issues, see Jacob
Werksman, “‘Taking note’ of the Copenhagen accord: what it means,” World Resources Institute,
December 20, 2009, available at: http://www.wri.org/stories/2009/12/taking-note-copenhagen-accord-whatit-means (last visited April 29, 2011); Jacob Werksman, “‘Associating with” the Copenhagen accord: What
does it mean?” World Resources Institute, March 25, 2010, available at:
http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/associating-copenhagen-accord-what-does-it-mean (last visited April
29, 2011).
38
Bodansky, “The Copenhagen climate change conference: A post-mortem,” supra note 34.
39
The Cancún Agreements, supra note 9, include texts which effectively ratified most of the key provisions
of the non-binding Copenhagen Accord, such as loose mitigation targets, a new climate fund for developing
countries, and a framework for “international consultations and analysis” to help ease tensions around
monitoring, reporting, and verification of country actions. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
“Sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and Sixth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,” December 2010,
available at: http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/cancun-climate-conference-cop16-summary.pdf (last
visited April 29, 2011). The COP-16 texts, however, also left many important questions unanswered,
including whether parties would agree to binding emissions reductions for the period commencing in 2012
and whether such reductions would be imposed through an extension of the Kyoto Protocol or via a new
legal instrument.
40
Interestingly, the term “developed party” was used for the first time ever in international law to describe
the members of Annex II of the UNFCCC, which includes members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECD] plus the European Community (Annex I), but excludes
eleven former socialist countries “undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.” Philippe
Sands, Principles of international environmental law, 2d ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 360, n. 253.
41
UNFCCC, supra note 19, Article 4(3).
42
UNFCCC, supra note 19, Articles 4(1), (3).
37
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most controversially, developed country parties also agreed, under Article 4(4), to assist
those developing countries that are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects” of
climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation to these effects.43 While these financial
commitments have been expanded by subsequent agreements such as the 2007 Bali
Action Plan,44 the 2009 Copenhagen Accord45 and the Cancún Agreements concluded in
December 2010,46 discussed in greater detail in Part C.2 below, it is worth recalling here
that the plain text of the Convention itself calls for the mobilization of climate-friendly
FDI, setting the stage for some degree of coordination between climate policy and the IIL
regime.
2.Sub-global and Regional Initiatives
While a legally binding multilateral instrument to replace the Kyoto Protocol
remained in doubt in early 2011, many States turned to sub-global arrangements in order
to advance a more piecemeal and less contentious strategy for climate policy
coordination. Examining this phenomenon, Robert Keohane and David Victor identify
four climate “clubs” which enable key clusters of countries to cooperate, notwithstanding
ongoing gridlock within the UNFCCC negotiations.47 These clubs include the Group of
Eight (G8)48 and its newer, larger configuration, the Group of Twenty (G20),49 the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP)50 and the Major
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF).51 While each club’s
membership overlaps, at times substantially, with the other three, each has generated its
own framework for climate policymaking and each has attracted different resources and
institutional backers. Each club also engages distinct aspects of the IIL regime.
a.G8
Consideration of climate change at the G852 began in earnest at the 2005 G8
summit in Gleneagles, Scotland.53 There, the eight major industrialized countries issued a
43

See Sands, Principles of international environmental law, supra note 40, p. 366.
UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan), UN Document FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, March 14,
2008, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf (last visited April 29, 2011).
45
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 9.
46
Cancún Agreements, supra note 9.
47
Keohane and Victor, “The regime complex for climate change,” supra note 18, p. 6.
48
University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, available at: http://www.g8.utoronto.ca (last visited April
30, 2011).
49
G20, What is the G20, available at: http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited April 29,
2011).
50
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, Welcome to the Asia-Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate, available at:
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx (last visited April 29, 2011).
51
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, Major Economies Forum, available at:
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org (last visited April 29, 2011).
52
Since 1975, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United
States have gathered at an annual summit to discuss financial regulation and other pressing global
governance matters. This club, known as the Group of Seven or G7, was expanded to include Russia in
1998 and renamed the G8. Although the G7 countries continue to meet as a separate bloc alongside the G8,
it is the G8 that has provided a platform for recent collective statements on climate policy. For more
44
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joint communiqué titled “Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development,” which
outlined the interconnected challenges posed by climate change and poverty, as
articulated by the UNFCCC and Millennium Development Goals, and provided a
roadmap for collective action on both issues.54 The Gleneagles communiqué is
noteworthy for several reasons. First, it notes the interrelationship between climate
change and development, clarifying the important complementary roles for foreign aid
and FDI in mitigating GHG emissions while helping alleviate poverty.55
Second, the communiqué contains a “plan of action” specifying key undertakings
on everything from the efficiency of buildings and appliances to the development of
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology to the encouragement of World Bank
and export credit agency (ECA) lending for low-carbon investments.56 Third, and perhaps
most relevant to the issue of climate change policy’s interaction with IIL, the
communiqué describes specific steps to be taken to “remove barriers to direct
investment” in low-carbon projects and “leverage private capital for clean
development.”57 By framing the issue of climate finance explicitly in terms of private
sector investment and public-private partnerships, the communiqué prefigures subsequent
developments such as the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements and sets the
stage for potential harmonization between climate policy and IIL. Since Gleneagles, the
G8 has continued to serve as a forum for collective deliberation on climate change policy,
with each subsequent annual communiqué including a statement on the issue.58
b.G20
For the first decade of its existence, the G20 was a relatively low-profile
institution, serving as a forum for coordination between finance ministers and central

information on this history, see University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, What is the G8?, available
at: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
53
Although climate change was included on the agenda at the 2003 G8 summit in Evian, France, it was
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s insistence on its importance that guaranteed the prominence of the
issue at the 2005 Scotland summit, which Blair chaired. Henrike Peichert and Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf, “G8
impact on international climate change negotiations: good or bad?,” 2007 Annual Conference of the British
International Studies Association: held at Cambridge, from 17 to 19 December 2007, available at:
http://ecologic.eu/2221 (last visited April 30, 2011).
54
G8, “Communiqué issued following the Gleneagles summit: held at Gleneagles, Scotland, from 6 to 8
July 2005,” (2005), available at:
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/government_support/PostG8_Gleneagles_Communiq
ue.pdf (last visited April 30, 2011) [hereinafter Gleneagles communiqué].
55
Id., paras. 1-2.
56
Id.
57
Id., paras. 21-22.
58
See, e.g., University of Toronto, G7/G8 summit meetings, St. Petersburg summit documents, St.
Petersburg plan of action global energy security, available at:
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/energy.html#plan (last visited April 30, 2011); G8
Muskoka declaration recovery and new beginnings, 25 to 26 June 2010, available at:
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-declarationmuskoka.aspx?lang=eng (last visited April 30, 2011).
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bank governors from the world’s most “systemically important” countries.59 This
changed in the fall of 2008 when the United States hosted a G20 summit in Washington,
D.C. coinciding with the height of the financial crisis. The summit, which was followed
by two additional summits in 2009, in London and Pittsburgh, transformed the G20 from
a largely technocratic body into the preeminent international summit for political leaders.
While the primary objective of the G20 remains international financial stability and
regulation, the Pittsburgh leaders’ statement expanded the G20’s goals to include
sustainable development and climate change.60 The statement created a “Framework for
Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth,” with commitments to:
Rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies
that encourage wasteful consumption; [...] [s]timulate investment in clean energy,
renewables, and energy efficiency and provide financial and technical support for
such projects in developing countries; […] [and] intensify our efforts, in
cooperation with other parties, to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the
UNFCCC negotiation.61
A comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen was a bridge too far.62 And, when the G20
met in South Korea in November 2010 countries had still largely failed to live up to their
commitments to cut fossil fuel subsidies.63 But because leaders in Pittsburgh agreed that
the G20 would henceforth replace the G8 as the preeminent forum for future policy
coordination,64 opportunities may yet emerge at the G20 level to push for harmonization
between climate policy and the IIL regime.
c.Asia-Pacific Partnership
The Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) was launched by the leaders of Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States in 2005 at the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum in Laos.65 At the time of its founding,
59

Randall Germain, “Global financial governance and the problem of inclusion,” 7 Global Governance
411(2001), p. 416.
60
G20, Pittsburgh leaders’ statement, available at:
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm (last visited April 30, 2011).
61
Id., paras. 29, 31-32.
62
See Part A.1, infra.
63
See “Green view: How to save $300 billion,” The Economist, November 12, 2010, available at:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/11/fossil-fuel_subsidies (last visited April 30, 2011)
(citing a 2010 study which found that no country has initiated a subsidy reform specifically in response to
the G20).
64
See, e.g., Ann Davies, “Major win for Australia as G20 permanently replaces the G8,” The Age
(Australia), September 26, 2009 available at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/major-win-for-australiaas-g20-permanently-replaces-the-g8-20090925-g6d0.html (last visited April 30, 2011). But see Daniel
Price, “Comment: G20 version 2.0 will appease the skeptics,” Financial Times, March 31, 2011 (“[T]he
G20 is not the right forum to address all global issues. It is not a committee to save the world. […] [T]he
G20 must guard against mission creep, which could undercut its efficacy on the global economic issues
squarely within its remit.”), available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0dea9aa-5bc4-11e0-b8e700144feab49a.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
65
See media release, Honorable Alexander Downer, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, “AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate,” (August 11, 2005), available at:
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many observers viewed the founding of the APP as a cynical response to lingering
criticism about the United States’ decision to forsake the Kyoto Protocol; President
George W. Bush warmly welcomed the new forum for cooperation on research and
development of new technologies while eschewing the binding emissions caps imposed
by the UNFCCC.66
The APP was created with four purposes in mind: (i) to create a “voluntary, nonlegally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the development,
diffusion, deployment, and transfer of” clean and efficient technologies; (ii) to promote
regulatory environments to assist such efforts; (iii) to “facilitate attainment” of each
country’s “national pollution reduction, energy security and climate change objectives,”
and; (iv) to “provide a forum” for further collaboration on “interlinked development,
energy, environment, and climate change issues” among the seven members of the
Partnership.67 Commentators are split on whether the APP’s voluntary, industry-based
approach represents progress or backsliding by major emitters such as the United States
and Australia.68 Some argue that the club’s small and strategically important membership
roster make it a useful complement to the clumsy UNFCCC negotiating process, while
others doubt whether the vague and non-binding nature of members’ commitments will
yield measurable reductions in GHG emissions.69
d.Major Economies Forum
Like the APP, the Major Economies Forum (MEF) was conceived of as an
alternative forum to the UNFCCC, where a small group of strategically important
countries could coordinate their climate and energy policies. In fact, according to one
account, the Bush administration created the MEF (originally dubbed the “Major Emitters
Forum” in 2007 and rebranded only later, in 2009, as the “Major Economies Forum on
Energy and Climate Change”) after recognizing that the APP was “too small and without
much practical significance.”70 The MEF membership consists of sixteen States plus the
European Union. The MEF’s roster overlaps entirely with that of the G20, with the

http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2005/js_cdc.html (last visited April 30, 2011). Canada became
the organization’s seventh member at the APP’s Second Ministerial Meeting in New Delhi on October 15,
2007.
66
Keohane and Victor, “The regime complex for climate change,” supra note 18, p. 6.
67
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, About the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development & Climate, available at: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx (last
visited April 30, 2011).
68
Richard Black, “Climate pact: for good or bad?,” BBC News, July 28, 2005, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4725681.stm (last visited April 30, 2011).
69
For an overview of these opposing views, see Peter Lawrence, “The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (AP6): A distraction to the Kyoto process or a viable alternative?,” 10 Asia
Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 183 (2007). See also Harro Van Asselt, “From UN-ity to diversity?
The UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific Partnership, and the future of international law on climate change,” 1
Carbon and Climate Law Review 17 (2007); Sarah A. Peay, “Joining the Asia-Pacific Partnership: The
environmentally sound decision?,” 18 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy
477 (2007).
70
Keohane and Victor, “The regime complex for climate change,” supra note 18, p. 6.
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exception of Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which are geopolitically important
countries for the purposes of the G20 but do not rank highly as major emitters of GHGs.
The MEF, like the APP, represents something more than a negotiating bloc at
UNFCCC meetings, but something less than a quasi-international institution such as the
G8 and G20. As in the case of the APP, the MEF countries have created work streams
dedicated to fostering cooperation in particular industries such as renewable energy,
advanced vehicles, bio-energy, and energy efficiency in buildings. And like the G8 and
G20, the MEF leaders have issued formal declarations following high-level summits.
Indeed, the first “Leaders’ Declaration” of the MEF was released on July 9, 2009,71
following the First Leaders’ Meeting held in L’Aquila, Italy alongside the 35th G8
summit held in the same location from July 8-10.72 As of this writing, the format for
future MEF collaboration, as well as coordination between initiatives organized by the
APP, G8/G20, and MEF, remained unclear.
3.Bilateral Arrangements
Like the regional initiatives discussed above, bilateral arrangements on climate
change are gaining prominence as prospects remain dim for a comprehensive post-2012
global climate treaty. As with BITs in the investment law context, bilateral climate deals
are open to criticism on the grounds that they undermine comprehensive international
efforts to mitigate global GHG emissions. Moreover, a strong case can be made that the
problem of carbon leakage militates in favor of a coordinated multilateral policy on
climate change and against ad hoc bilateral arrangements.73 Nevertheless, with just two
countries (China and the United States) responsible for approximately 40 percent of
aggregate global carbon dioxide emissions,74 bilateral deals hold out the promise of

71

Major Economies Forum, “Declaration of the leaders: Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate,”
July 9, 2010, available at: http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-leadersmeeting.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
72
See G8, from La Maddalena to L’Aquila, Italy’s year at the helm of the G8 comes to an end, available at:
http://www.g8italia2009.it (last visited April 30, 2011). The 2009 Leaders’ Declaration established a new
institution, the “Global Partnership for Low Carbon Energy,” which was meant to “drive transformational
low-carbon, climate-friendly technologies.” In establishing the Global Partnership, MEF leaders
emphasized that they would “dramatically increase and coordinate public sector investments in [...] these
technologies, with a view to doubling such investments by 2015, while recognizing the importance of
private investment, public-private partnerships and international cooperation.” Major Economies Forum,
“Declaration of the Leaders: Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate,” supra note 71.
73
Carbon leakage refers to the migration of emissions from jurisdictions where the cost of carbon is high to
those where it is relatively low (or unpriced). The classic example is the relocation of energy-intensive
manufacturing from Europe, where the European Union Emissions Trading System imposes a cap on
carbon dioxide emissions, to China, where emissions are still largely unregulated. See generally Robert N.
Stavins, “A meaningful U.S. cap-and-trade system to address climate change,” 32 Harvard Environmental
Law Review 293 (2008) (discussing leakage as it applies to cap-and-trade schemes). See also Michael
Vandenberg and Mark Cohen, “Climate change governance: Boundaries and leakage,” 18 New York
University Environmental Law Journal 221 (2010) (proposing a new strategy to counteract leakage effects
based on information disclosure).
74
United Nations Statistics Division, millennium development goals indictors: Carbon dioxide emissions,
available at: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid= (last visited April 30, 2011).
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meaningful progress on climate change, especially while UNFCCC negotiations remain
largely gridlocked.
Bilateral climate arrangements have been established on a variety of topics, from
collaboration on research and development to technology transfer to foreign investment.
Although the vast majority of these arrangements do not create binding obligations under
international law, the arrangements’ proliferation nevertheless represents significant
transnational action on climate change. Furthermore, in many cases such agreements
anticipate a leading role for private investment in clean energy projects. The United
States and China, for instance, signed a July 2009 memorandum of understanding to
enhance cooperation on climate and energy matters.75 This built upon a “Framework for
Ten Year Cooperation on Energy and Environment”76 concluded the previous year. The
July agreement was elaborated upon, in turn, during President Obama’s November 2009
visit to Beijing,77 at which President Obama and his counterpart President Hu Jintao
announced seven new projects and initiatives, including the United States-China Clean
Energy Research Center, the United States-China Electric Vehicles Initiative and a
program on “21st Century Coal,” which features an agreement on the joint construction
of Chinese CCS facilities by United States firms and major Chinese partners.78 The
United States penned a similar deal with India in late 2009,79 emphasizing many of the
same issues.
The European Union, like the United States, has developed a framework for
bilateral cooperation with China. The European Union’s agreement with China is known
as the European Union-China Climate Change Partnership,80 which includes subsidiary
agreements establishing the Europe-China Clean Energy Centre and the Near Zero
Emissions Coal Project, through which the European Union has agreed to finance the
construction of a coal plant using advanced CCS technology.81 In addition, some EU
Member States have indicated that they plan to fulfill their UNFCCC climate finance
commitments, including the “fast start” funding promised in Copenhagen for the period
75

Memorandum of understanding to enhance cooperation on climate change, energy and the environment
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China, July 18, 2009, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126592.htm (last visited
April 30, 2011).
76
United States Department of State, United States-China Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy
and Environment, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/oes/env/tenyearframework/index.htm (last visited
April 30, 2011).
77
United States Department of Energy, United States-China clean energy announcements, November 17,
2009, available at: http://www.energy.gov/news/8292.htm (last visited April 30, 2011).
78
Id.
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Press release, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact sheet: U.S.-India green partnership to
address energy security, climate change, and food security,” November 24, 2009, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Green_Partnership_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited April 30,
2011).
80
European Commission, European Union and China partnership on climate change, September 2, 2005,
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/298 (last visited April 30,
2011).
81
See NZEC carbon capture and storage, what is NZEC?, available at: http://www.nzec.info/en/what-isnzec (last visited April 30, 2011).
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from 2010-12, through bilateral deals.82 According to the chairperson of the European
Parliament’s environment committee, EU Member States may also seek to draft
technology transfer agreements on a bilateral basis.83
Beyond these general climate arrangements, States are concluding specialized
bilateral agreements on issues as diverse as nuclear power and forest conversation. Japan,
while refusing at COP-16 to endorse a second commitment period under the Kyoto
Protocol in the absence of stronger emissions reduction commitments from China and
others,84 quietly unveiled a new initiative to provide major financial support to
developing countries for the construction of nuclear power plants.85 And, countries such
as Norway are taking big steps forward on bilateral forest protection schemes under the
rubric of REDD, discussed in greater depth in Part C.1 below. Norway’s “International
Climate and Forest Initiative,”86 launched at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP-13)
summit in 2007, allocates up to US$ 500 million per year for forest protection initiatives.
As of April 2011, Norway had entered into financing agreements with Brazil, Guyana,
Indonesia, Mexico, Tanzania, as well as with multinational entities such as the Congo
Basin Forest Fund administered by the Africa Development Bank.87
As in the investment law arena, bilateral climate deals are also proliferating along
the South-South axis, as developing countries take positions of greater prominence on the
global stage. In October 2009, China and India signed their first bilateral agreement on
climate, establishing a “Joint Working Group” to coordinate the countries’ negotiating
positions at the Copenhagen summit but also to collaborate on joint research on
renewable energy and clean coal.88 And, at a November 2010 bilateral summit in Cape
Town, China pledged a US$ 20 billion line of credit to South Africa for renewable and
nuclear energy projects, hoping that such credit will facilitate “outward bound movement
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“Bilateral deals mushroom as climate treaty falters,” EurActive.com, October 1, 2010, available at:
http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-environment/bilateral-deals-mushroom-climate-treaty-falters-news498187 (last visited April 30, 2011).
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York Times, December 10, 2010 (“Japan brought the issue to a head on the first day of negotiations in this
Yucatan peninsula resort town when it declared unequivocally that it would not submit new greenhouse gas
emission targets under a second phase of the treaty in 2012”).
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Juliet Eilperin and William Booth, “Some aren’t waiting for climate consensus,” Washington Post,
December 10, 2010. Of course, in the aftermath of the crisis at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant,
which began with the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, Japan’s political, diplomatic and financial
posture vis-à-vis nuclear energy is very much open to reconsideration. At the time of this writing, the
country’s commitment to finance the construction of new nuclear power facilities, at home or abroad,
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available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Selected-topics/climate/the-government-of-norwaysinternational-/what-do-we-finance.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
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See “India and China sign their first bilateral agreement on climate,” Hindustan Times, October 21, 2009,
available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-and-China-sign-their-first-bilateral-agreement-onclimate/Article1-467517.aspx (last visited April 30, 2011).
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for Chinese companies” seeking new markets.89 Such developments augur well for the
future of low-carbon investment: As FDI flows in general are increasingly originating in
and directed towards emerging economies where future GHG emissions are predicted to
grow fastest, so too will clean energy investments flow more readily along a South-South
axis.90
4.National Regulation
Despite the global nature of the problem, most regulation on climate change still
occurs at the national level. This is due in part to the persistence of the Westphalian
nation-State as the predominant actor on the global stage, but can also be traced back to a
more pedestrian rationale: The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I parties to limit their
aggregate domestic emissions through appropriate national legislation. All Annex I
parties have taken steps to meet their quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, but the preeminent example here is
the EU ETS, which commenced operation on January 1, 2005 and which has been
adopted in the national legislation of each EU Member State.91 Implementation of the EU
ETS has proceeded in stages. Phase I, which ran from 2005-2007, was characterized by
“learning by doing” among EU Member States and regulated entities; many mistakes
were made, and the nascent European carbon market experienced wide swings and steep
drops in value.92 Phase II, known as the “Kyoto Commitment Phase,” runs from 20082012 and is “aimed at achieving the reduction targets set by the Kyoto Protocol,”93 a goal
which, as of this writing, seemed unlikely to be met. Phase III of the EU ETS, which will
89

Mandy Rossouw, “China’s sweet climate change deal,” Mail and Guardian (South Africa), November
19, 2010, available at: http://www.frontier-advisory.com/chinas-sweet-climate-change-deal (last visited
May 2, 2011).
90
It must be noted here, however, that many of the benefits of such South-South clean energy investments
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begin in 2013, will feature several important changes, including the setting of a
community-wide cap on emissions rather than cap-setting through “National Allocation
Plans,” and the substitution of allowance auctioning for the current system, in which
emission allowances are freely allocated to emitters.94
Because of its stringent emissions cap and its authorization of offsetting
mechanisms such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM and joint implementation schemes,95 the
EU ETS has spurred significant private sector investment in low-carbon technologies
while also affecting the property rights of innumerable firms and individuals.96
Unsurprisingly, it has also generated significant legal controversy. In March 2010, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a final ruling in a landmark case brought by
Arcelor SA, a steel manufacturer, challenging certain ETS provisions that allegedly
“infring[ed] its right to property and its freedom to pursue an economic activity, which
constitute fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order.”97 The ECJ
rejected Arcelor’s challenge, upholding the EU ETS while noting that “the right to
property and the right to pursue an economic activity did not constitute ‘absolute
prerogatives,’ but had to be ‘viewed in relation to their social function.’”98 Neither the
EU ETS nor other forms of national climate regulation have yet to generate an investment
treaty claim by an aggrieved foreign investor,99 but experts agree that the question is not
if, but when, such a claim will be filed.100

94

Id., pp. 347-55.
See infra notes 193-199 and accompanying text. The EU ETS allows firms to use CERs and ERUs to
offset their emissions reduction obligations under the cap. Although as of December 2010 the EU ETS did
not grant offset credits for avoided deforestation and forest conservation projects, some observers noted
that the adoption of REDD at COP-16 in Mexico signaled a growing willingness among Europeans to
consider allowing international forest carbon offsets into the ETS.
96
For a discussion of the legal nature of emissions permits and offset credits such as CERs generated via
CDM projects, see Jolene Lin, “Private actors in international and domestic emissions trading systems,” in
David Freestone and Charlotte Streck, eds., Legal aspects of carbon trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and
beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 142.
97
Case T-16/04, Arcelor SA v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2010 E.C.R
00000, para. 146. This case followed closely on the heels of another challenge to the EU ETS, based in part
on an argument about ETS infringement on the principle of equal treatment (nondiscrimination). See Case
C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, 2008 E.C.R. I-9895.
98
Chester Brown, “International, mixed, and private disputes arising under the Kyoto Protocol,” 1 Journal
of International Dispute Settlement 447 (2010), p. 461 (citing Arcelor SA, para. 153). For a summary of the
facts and holdings in the Arcelor case, as well as other cases challenging European Union and Member
State actions taken pursuant to the EU ETS, see id. pp. 461-63.
99
See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
100
See, e.g., Brown, “International, mixed, and private disputes arising under the Kyoto Protocol,” supra
note 98; Marshall, “Climate change and international investment agreements: Obstacles or opportunities,”
supra note 2. Although climate-friendly regulatory measures can theoretically yield a panoply of
investment treaty claims, certain host country actions seem more likely than others to spur claims by
investors. For instance, government procurement policies imposing performance requirements on goods or
stipulating that goods must be manufactured using low-carbon energy sources could conceivably fall afoul
of a BIT’s national treatment clause. See Part B.5, infra. Likewise, an aggrieved fossil fuel investor might
try to argue that the initiation of a strict cap-and-trade program with auctioned – rather than allocated –
allowances constitutes a measure “tantamount to expropriation,” see Part B.3, infra, or is a violation of the
investor’s “legitimate expectations,” see Part B.4, infra.
95
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5.Sub-national Policies
Many countries, including those that have promulgated comprehensive national
emission reduction legislation, are also experimenting with a variety of sub-national
climate policies. Sub-national policies are taking on particular importance in the United
States, since federal cap-and-trade legislation failed to pass the Senate in 2010 and, at the
time of this writing, appeared unlikely to be revisited before 2013 at the earliest.
Moreover, because some sub-national entities such as the state of California are
themselves among the top GHG emitters worldwide,101 sub-national policies can generate
significant emissions reductions even in the absence of a comprehensive national climate
policy.102
Sub-national climate regulation in the United States is occurring simultaneously at
the municipal, state, and regional levels. This “plural architecture”103 holds out great
possibilities for innovation, collaboration and mutual learning across jurisdictions, but
also increases the risk of wasteful duplication and, worse, mutually incompatible
regulatory regimes. In many countries, as in the United States, a federal system of
government allows for concurrent national and sub-national jurisdiction over many
spheres of economic and social activity.104 In some instances, federal preemption can
stymie state experimentation in areas where federal rules displace sub-national
jurisdictions’ authority to regulate.105 However, although several challenges were
pending as this chapter was submitted for publication, regional, state and local climate
regulation in the United States is proceeding apace largely without substantial
interference from the courts.106
101

If California were a country, it would rank as the world’s 18th largest emitter of greenhouse gases, with
slightly less emissions than Iran and slightly more than South Africa. In the United States, only Texas ranks
higher, at 8th, ahead of Canada and slightly behind Brazil. World Resources Institute, climate analysis
indicators tool (CAIT), 2007, available at: http://cait.wri.org (last visited April 30, 2011).
102
For an overview of the issues related to sub-national climate change regulation in the United States, see
generally Richard B. Stewart, “States (and cities) as actors in global climate regulation: Unitary vs. plural
architectures,” 50 Arizona Law Review 681 (2008).
103
Id.
104
For an illuminating discussion of federalism and climate change, see Blake Hudson, “Federal
constitutions and global governance: The case of climate change,” 87 Indiana Law Journal __
(forthcoming 2012).
105
In Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the United States Supreme Court explored these preemption
principles in ruling that federal drug laws do not preempt state common law tort claims against drug
manufacturers. For a discussion of the state of the debate on preemption, see Gregory Dickinson,
“Chevron's sliding scale in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009),” 33 Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy 1177 (2010).
106
For a comprehensive account of all climate-related litigation in the United States, including preemption
challenges to state and local regulation, see Columbia Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law
School, Climate change litigation in the U.S. (chart), available at: http://www.climatecasechart.com (last
visited April 30, 2011). Of course, challenges to climate-related regulatory activities in the United States
are coming not only in the form of lawsuits, but also through controversial legislative attacks in Congress.
Several bills and amendments passed in the House of Representatives in early 2011 would strip EPA of its
ability to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, as it has been legally obligated to do since 2007 under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Columbia Center for
Climate Change Law maintains a useful tracking service of congressional activities on climate change,
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At the regional level, multi-state schemes such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI)107 and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)108 have taken the lead in
creating markets for carbon emissions reduction credits. With ten participating states as
of early 2011,109 RGGI represents an accord to cap regional carbon dioxide emissions
from power plants at 188 million tons per year, which was projected to be the total power
plant emissions for the region in 2009. Member states agreed to reduce this figure by 2.5
percent each year between 2015 and 2019 for a total reduction of 10 percent, achieved in
part via trading emissions allowances. The New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation points out that this phased-in approach “will provide predictable market
signals and regulatory certainty.”110 On September 25, 2008 RGGI held its first emissions
allowance auction, with fifty-nine entities participating, including utility and energy
companies, financial institutions, and environmental groups.111 Across the country, the
WCI published final reporting requirements for participating jurisdictions in July 2009.112
Together with rules for harmonizing WCI reporting and the requirements of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Mandatory Reporting Rule for GHG
emissions,113 this represents an important step towards the launch of full-scale emissions
trading, currently scheduled to commence on January 1, 2012.114 Meanwhile, WCI
member states115 took steps of their own to meet their reductions requirements under the
available at: http://www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/legislation (last visited April
30, 2011).
107
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative [hereinafter RGGI], available at: http://www.rggi.org/home (last
visited 2011).
108
Western Climate Initiative [hereinafter WCI], available at: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last
visited April 30, 2011).
109
RGGI members in 2010 were Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. Pennsylvania and the Canadian provinces
of New Brunswick, Ontario and Québec are official observers. See RGGI, the ten states, available at:
http://www.rggi.org/states/ten_states (last visited April 30, 2011). In early 2011, several states under the
leadership of Republican governors, including New Hampshire and New Jersey, signaled their intent to
withdraw from the accord. Indeed, as this chapter was submitted for publication, the New Hampshire
House of Representatives had voted to pull out of the program. Ehren Goossens, “New Hampshire House
votes to withdraw from regional carbon trading market,” Bloomberg, March 30, 2011, available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-30/new-hampshire-house-votes-to-withdraw-from-regionalcarbon-trading-market.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
110
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, How the carbon dioxide budget trading
program works, available at: http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/39276.html (last visited April 27, 2011.)
111
See RGGI Auction Results, Auction 1, available at: http://rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results/auction1
(last visited April 27, 2011).
112
WCI, final essential requirements for mandatory reporting for the Western Climate Initiative, available
at: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/Reporting-Committee-Documents/FinalEssential-Requirements-for-Mandatory-Reporting/ (last visited April 27, 2011).
113
WCI, harmonization of essential requirements for mandatory reporting in U.S. jurisdictions with EPA
mandatory reporting rule, available at: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/news-and-updates/125harmonization-of-essential-requirements-for-mandatory-reporting-in-us-jurisdictions-with-epa-mandatoryreporting-rule (last visited April 27, 2011).
114
See WCI, Frequently Asked Questions, available at: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wcicap-and-trade-program/faq#question7 (last visited April 27, 2011).
115
Seven United States states are members of the WCI (Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah and Washington), as are four Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and
Quebec). See WCI, WCI partners and observers, available at: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-
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WCI framework,116 including anticipatory measures creating possible avenues of linkage
between the WCI, RGGI and potentially other regional emissions trading schemes.
At the state level, as with so many other United States environmental issues,
California is taking the lead. After the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 32
(AB 32), the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) began work to establish a comprehensive statewide regulatory scheme,
including cap-and-trade rules scheduled to go into effect in 2011. AB 32, which requires
California to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020,117 survived a high-stakes
ballot initiative put to California voters in November 2010, which would have effectively
stripped CARB of its authority to regulate GHGs.118 In March 2011, implementation by
CARB of climate regulations pursuant to AB 32 was blocked by a California Superior
Court decision, which held that CARB had violated the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) by failing to conduct an adequate environmental review of its
implementation decisions. The court found that CARB had failed to adequately consider,
describe, and analyze alternatives to the cap-and-trade program (such as a direct carbon
tax) in its scoping plan and improperly began implementing the scoping plan measures
before its CEQA process was complete.119 The future timeline for implementation by

partners-and-observers-map (last visited April 27, 2011). Interestingly, Canadian provinces begun
participating in the WCI at the same time that Canada’s central government was pushing for a bilateral
climate agreement with the Obama administration. See, e.g., “Canada to seek climate-change deal with
Obama,” Business Week, Novovember 5, 2008. This “disconnect” between state and federal action, on both
sides of the border, presents not only significant challenges in terms of foreign affairs preemption and
federalism, on both sides of the United States-Canada border. These issues are beyond the scope of this
chapter. For a compelling account of the preemption and federalism problems raised by subnational action
on climate change, see Judith Resnik, “Foreign as domestic affairs: rethinking horizontal federalism and
foreign affairs preemption in light of translocal internationalism,” 57 Emory Law Journal 31 (2007).
116
See, e.g., Celeste Lecompte, “Oregon approves greenhouse gas reporting rules” New York Times,
October 24, 2008. See also California Air Resources Board, AB 32 climate change scoping plan document,
available at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/scopingplandocument.htm (last visited April
27, 2011).
117
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, California Health & Safety Code § 38550 (West 2006).
118
See Colin Sullivan and Debra Kahn, “Voters reject 2-sided assault on climate law,” New York Times,
November 3, 2010.
119
Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board (Cal. Super. Ct. March 18, 2011).
Petitioners in the case include environmental justice groups representing lower-income communities
largely in Southern California, and the Association of Irritated Residents, a central-valley based group that
in the last few years has sought relief on environmental matters in over a dozen cases. They argue that the
CARB violated its obligations under CEQA by treating its scoping plan as a post-hoc rationalization for
policies it had already decided upon. Petitioners believe a cap-and-trade program would allow industrial
facilities, many situated in low-income communities, to continue to emit non-GHG pollutants while
lowering their carbon output indirectly through emissions trading on the carbon market. In reaching its
March 18 decision, the Court did not address these environmental justice concerns, but focused instead on a
narrow procedural question: whether CARB analyzed alternatives to cap-and-trade under the law. For an
excellent collection of commentary on the lawsuit and its likely impacts on AB 32 implementation, see
Sean Hecht, “The recent court decision blocking California’s scoping plan to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions: one-stop shopping for recent Legal Planet commentary,” Legal Planet, March 28, 2011,
available at: http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/the-recent-court-decision-blocking-californiasscoping-plan-to-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions-one-stop-shopping-for-recent-legal-planetcommentary/#more-9811 (last visited April 27, 2011).
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CARB of its cap-and-trade program remained in doubt as this chapter was submitted for
publication.
One particularly noteworthy development in connection with sub-national climate
policy is the initiation of international partnerships between states and cities, rather than
at the level of national governments. In the United States, for instance, state officials are
moving forward in the international arena even in the absence of federal climate
legislation. On November 16, 2010, California’s then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed two memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the governors of Acre, Brazil and
Chiapas, Mexico establishing a “sub-national Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation working group” to “develop recommendations” due to be
reported to CARB in October 2011. These recommendations will help bring “subnational REDD programs into California’s cap-and-trade program to allow California
companies to use REDD credits for compliance.”120
A week after Schwarzenegger’s announcement, a worldwide summit of mayors
and local leaders held in Mexico City produced a voluntary agreement, known as the
Global Cities Covenant on Climate, to coordinate mitigation and adaptation activities at
the municipal level.121 These transnational initiatives, like others being undertaken by
state and municipal leaders worldwide, raise domestic legal issues related to
constitutional federalism and foreign affairs, while also calling into question some of the
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, which were designed with nation States, not subnational entities, in mind. Nevertheless, they represent a potentially significant avenue for
international cooperation on climate change and hold out the possibility of real emissions
reductions at a time when some national governments may seem less willing to act.
B.The

International Investment Law Regime

The protection of foreign property under international law has a long and storied
history,122 but the modern era for IIL began in earnest only in 1959 when West Germany
and Pakistan concluded the world’s first bilateral investment treaty.123 In the ensuing five
decades States have entered into thousands of BITs, 2,750 of which were in force as of
December 2009, together with 295 additional IIAs.124 Much like the variegated “regime
complex” covering aspects of climate change policy, IIL lacks a single, comprehensive
120

Press Release, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (California), “Gov. Schwarzenegger announces
agreement with Mexico and Brazil to combat climate change, protect forests at GGCS 3,” November 16,
2010.
121
World Mayors Summit on Climate, the Mexico City Pact, available at: http://www.wmsc2010.org/themexico-city-pact (last visited April 27, 2011).
122
Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of international investment law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), pp. 1-30; M. Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment, 2d ed.,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 18-30.
123
Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, West Germany-Pakistan (signed 25 November
1959, entered into force 26 March 1963) 457 UNTS 23.
124
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a low-carbon economy, supra note 11, p. 81.
The relationship between the existence of IIAs and FDI flows is contested. For an excellent overview of the
issues, see Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, eds., The effect of treaties on foreign direct investment (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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mechanism to regulate the conduct of states, firms and individuals vis-à-vis transnational
investment.125 Rather, a set of interrelated principles, norms and governance structures
have emerged through the drafting and interpretation, in investor-State disputes, of
thousands of distinct IIAs. Such IIAs can take the form of BITs, regional investment
treaties such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the investment
chapters of free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), or the investment-oriented provisions of treaties focusing on other
subject matter, such the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). This Part introduces the features
common to nearly all of these IIAs and identifies those areas where they are most likely
to interact, both positively and negatively, with climate policy.
1.Object and purpose of IIAs
In resolving investment disputes, arbitral panels interpret the operative provisions
of IIAs according to the principles enumerated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, which refers to the objects and purposes of treaties.126 Loosely
speaking, the “object and purpose” of a treaty indicates parties’ fundamental intentions in
concluding a given instrument.127 These intentions tend to be gleaned from both
reasonable assumptions about the general pro-investment purposes of investment treaties
as well as specific preambular language, which may highlight additional purposes.128
Traditionally, preambular language in IIAs has been narrowly focused on the
desirability of foreign investment per se and on the economic benefits of such investment
for both home and host countries. For instance, the preamble of the 2005 United
Kingdom Model BIT simply states:
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of ____; Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater
investment by nationals and companies of one State in the territory of the other
State; Recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under
international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation
125

This was not for lack of trying. In the mid-1990s, OECD countries attempted to negotiate a multilateral
agreement on investment (MAI), with the idea being that such a treaty would be concluded first by OECD
countries themselves and subsequently opened for signature by others. See Kenneth Vandevelde, “A brief
history of international investment agreements,” in Sauvant and Sachs, The effect of treaties on foreign
direct investment, supra note 124, p.33. In part due to a very effective international campaign against the
MAI coordinated by non-governmental organizations, the MAI negotiations failed and the initiative was
scrapped. See UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, Sales No. E.99.II.D.26 (New York: United Nations,
1999).
126
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 311 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], Article 31(1) (“A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose.”).
127
Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, supra note 122, p. 21.
128
Vienna Convention Article 31(2) states that a treaty’s preamble is part of the context for the
interpretation of object and purpose. For a general discussion of the applicability of Article 31(2) to the
interpretation of IIAs, see Jeswald Salacuse, The law of investment treaties (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010), pp. 146-48.
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of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States; Have
agreed as follows: [...]129
This wording, replicated more or less verbatim in many other IIAs,130 has led many
tribunals to resolve ambiguities in favor of claimants and place the burden of proof on
respondent States, even in cases where challenged host country regulatory measures are
undertaken for legitimate reasons such as to protect the environment or public health.131
More recently, States have expanded treaty preambles to include broader policy
considerations, rendering less tenable a one-dimensional “investor protection” rationale
for the objects and purposes of IIAs.132 For example, the 2004 United States Model BIT
includes a clause emphasizing that the treaty’s investment protection objectives should be
achieved “in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the
environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights.”133 Whereas a
tribunal considering a climate mitigation measure with arguably discriminatory impacts
on foreign investors may have sided with a claimant under the 2005 United Kingdom
Model BIT, the inclusion of these words in the United States Model could lead to a
finding that such a measure in fact complies with the treaty’s object and purpose. Other
examples go even further, incorporating sustainable development and other objectives
into not only preambular language but operative treaty provisions as well. We discuss this
trend and its implications for climate policy in Part D below.
2.Investor-state dispute settlement
A defining feature of most modern IIAs is the guarantee that investors can seek
binding international arbitration for alleged violations of the investors’ treaty rights
without first exhausting local remedies or seeking the diplomatic protection of the
investors’ home countries.134 An investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism has

129

Reproduced in Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, supra note 122, p. 376.
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of
the Republic of Djibouti on the promotion and protection of investments (China-Djibouti BIT) (signed 18
August 2003, not yet entered into force). [NB citation format]
131
See, e.g., Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 2007, award (February 6, 2007), para. 289;
Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, award, (July 14, 2006), para. 360; MTD v. Chile, supra
note 5, para. 113.
132
Peter Muchlinski, “The framework of investment protection: the content of BITs,” in Karl Sauvant and
Lisa Sachs, eds., The effect of treaties on foreign direct investment (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009), pp. 38.
133
2004 United States Model BIT, reproduced in Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international
investment law, supra note 122, p. 385.
134
For a detailed discussion of the evolution from diplomatic espousal under public international law
principles to investor-state arbitration under IIAs, see William S. Dodge, “Investor-state dispute settlement
between developed countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement” 39
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 (2006), pp. 5-14. For an examination of the investor-state
provisions in the NAFTA, see Daniel M. Price, “Chapter 11 investor-state dispute settlement: Frankenstein
or safety valve?,” 26 Canada-United States Law Journal 107 (2000). The insufficiency of traditional
methods of diplomatic espousal for the purposes of contemporary foreign investors can be illustrated by the
case of Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
130
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been featured in BITs since at least the early 1980s, when it was included in the first such
treaties negotiated by the United States.135 But prior to the conclusion of the NAFTA in
1994, “few (if any) claims were brought under these agreements and [...] direct litigation
between persons and States was a rarity.”136 Beginning in the mid-1990s, such provisions
became increasingly common. Only in the past few years have governments begun to
reconsider their commitment to binding ISDS.
Investor-State arbitration has been justified largely on the basis of an assumption
about the motivations of foreign investors. Conventional wisdom holds that in order to
attract foreign investment, host countries must shield foreigners from the vagaries of
domestic institutions such as courts. Because investors fear the expropriation or
diminution of their investment at the hands of local officials, it is thought that a host
country must bind itself with an “international commitment device” such as a BIT in
order to assure investors that they will be treated fairly. The internationalization of
dispute settlement via ISDS, which removes investor claims from domestic courts in
favor of international arbitral tribunals, thus serves to substitute for “poor institutional
environments” where the risks of investing would otherwise outweigh the benefits.137
In the late 1990s, the Governments of the United States, Canada and Mexico
awoke to the “sheer significance of the powers allocated to foreign investors and to
arbitrators under NAFTA Chapter 11”138 leading to both procedural and substantive
reforms of the NAFTA’s arbitration provisions. Around the same time, scholars began to
call into question the link between the availability of ISDS and the quantity of incoming
FDI,139 which had served as the primary justification for investor-State arbitration
provisions in IIAs. New research appears to demonstrate that these risks are overblown.
More pointedly, some developing countries have responded to these critiques by
renegotiating their BITs to exclude certain categories of investment from ISDS, requiring
investors to exhaust local remedies before seeking international arbitration140 and in a few
cases terminating entire treaty programs.141 Notwithstanding these developments, ISDS
today remains a key feature of most extant IIAs.
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5), in which the International Court of Justice required eight years to reject a claim on
jurisdictional grounds.
135
See generally Kenneth Vandevelde, “The bilateral investment treaty program of the United States,” 21
Cornell International Law Journal 201 (1988) (discussing development and features of US BIT program).
136
Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais, “The global fifth amendment: NAFTA’s investment protections and
the misguided quest for an international regulatory takings doctrine,” 78 New York University Law
Review 30 (2003), p. 45, n. 63.
137
Tom Ginsburg, “International substitutes for domestic institutions: Bilateral investment treaties and
governance,” 25 International Review of Law and Economics 107 (2005), p. 113.
138
Gus Van Harten, “Five justifications for investment treaties: A critical discussion,” 2 Trade, Law and
Development 19 (2010), p. 21.
139
Id. pp. 30-32 (summarizing eight empirical studies on the proposition that IIAs encourage investment
and concluding that “this justification for the system is [...] unsupported by the preponderance of empirical
evidence.”).
140
E.g., Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and Colombia on the reciprocal
promotion and protection of investments (Belgium-Colombia BIT) (signed February 4, 2009, not yet
entered into force), art. XII.
141
See Van Harten, “Five justifications for investment treaties: A critical discussion,” supra note 138, pp.
22-23.
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3.Expropriation
Of paramount concern for every foreign investor is the risk that a host country
government will seize the investor’s assets.142 The longstanding international law
principle of territorial sovereignty affirms a host country’s right to nationalize the
property of aliens, but customary international law (CIL) and treaties place certain
conditions on a government’s ability to legally expropriate.143 According to the most
common formulation, these conditions prohibit the expropriation of an alien’s investment
unless done for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner144 and conditioned on
the payment of “prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”145 Each of these
conditions has been the subject of enormous controversy and the standards for
expropriation under international law – including the definition of what actions constitute
an act of expropriation – are still very much contested.146
For present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on two key questions. First, what
constitutes an acceptable “public purpose” for an expropriation? Second, when do
administrative and regulatory actions of the host country government constitute “indirect”
or “creeping” expropriation or measures “tantamount to” expropriation by diminishing an
investor’s property rights, even though the host country’s actions leave the investor in
possession of the investment? Although arbitral tribunals have been divided on these
questions, certain principles can help elucidate the standards used to reach answers in
particular cases.
First, in determining whether an expropriation was carried out for a “public
purpose,” arbitral tribunals have taken one of three distinct and relatively incompatible
approaches, leaving both investors and host countries uncertain as to the standards to be
applied in future disputes. The first approach, embraced by the tribunals in Metalclad
(2000) and Santa Elena (2000) but disfavored in more recent disputes, considers the

142

Salacuse, The law of investment treaties, supra note 128, p. 285.
See August Reinisch, “Expropriation,” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer,
eds., Oxford handbook of international investment law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.
407-458. See also Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, supra note 122, p. 89.
144
Some investment treaties impose procedural due process requirements on the expropriating state, see
Article 6(1)(d) of the 2004 United States Model BIT, equating due process with the international minimum
standard of treatment under CIL and/or the requirement of fair and equitable treatment (FET). It is unclear
whether an explicit due process clause in an IIA creates an independent requirement for the legality of a
state’s expropriatory act or simply constitutes part of a more general non-discrimination obligation. See
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purpose of a challenged measure irrelevant if that measure has the effect of denying the
investor the benefit of its investment.147
The Metalclad tribunal, for instance, held that it “need not decide or consider the
motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree,” and found that “the
implementation of the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act
tantamount to expropriation.”148 Taking a similar stand, the Santa Elena tribunal held that
“[w]hile an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, [this] […] does not affect the
nature of the measure or the compensation to be paid for the taking. […] The
international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.”149
The second approach favors a balancing test in lieu of the effects test adopted by
earlier awards, looking to the burdens imposed on a foreign investor and the degree of
relationship between the means employed and the public purpose sought to be realized by
the challenged measure. The tribunal adopted this approach in 2003 in the Tecmed
case,150 which like Metalclad involved the siting of a hazardous waste facility. Citing
jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal in Tecmed held
that “a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate
thereto” and that the “requisite balance will not be found if the person concerned has had
to bear ‘an individual and excessive burden.’”151 Applying this standard, the tribunal
rejected claimant’s arguments that Mexico’s regulatory actions had amounted to an
expropriation.
The third and final approach is categorical, excluding “non-discriminatory
regulation for a public purpose [...] enacted in accordance with due process” from the
category of expropriation.152 This approach was adopted in Methanex (2005) and
followed by the tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic (2006), which
conclusively held that “the principle that a State does not commit an expropriation and is
thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts
general regulations that are ‘commonly accepted as within the police power of States’
forms part of customary international law today.”153
Notwithstanding the apparently chronological progression of these three
approaches, wherein earlier disputes adopting the first approach have given way to later
disputes adopting the second and third approaches, it would be wrong to interpret such
variation over time as a sort of jurisprudential evolution. Indeed, in the absence of the
principle of stare decisis, ad hoc international arbitral tribunals remain entirely free to
147
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pick and choose standards to apply to the facts of any given dispute, leaving the law on
expropriation persistently unsettled, with serious implications for climate policy. That
said, arbitrators do not live in a vacuum; over time, as climate change and issues such as
human rights are increasingly prioritized on the international stage, a legal realist would
expect arbitral tribunals to bend doctrine to changing norms and expectations. This
appears, in large measure, to be precisely what most arbitrators have done.
A second key question that emerges in the context of climate-related regulation is
whether a particular measure amounts to an “indirect” expropriation actionable under the
provisions of an IIA. In contemporary practice, direct nationalization of investments by
host country governments is exceedingly rare; indirect expropriations carried out through
administrative action are far more frequent.154 Investment tribunals have been divided on
the question of how to determine when an “indirect” or “creeping” expropriation has
occurred or when governmental action rises to the level of measures “tantamount to”
expropriation.155 In this regard, some scholars have criticized the NAFTA tribunals and
other arbitral bodies for misapplying the United States legal doctrine of “regulatory
takings” in the very different context of investor-State arbitration.156
The best that can be said here is simply that measures which interfere with an
investor’s property rights, such as disproportionate tax increases, interference with
contractual rights and the unjustified revocation of permits and licenses, have all been
found to constitute indirect expropriations by a variety of tribunals.157 Inevitably,
inquiries in this area tend to be fact-based and highly dependent upon the context in
which a state has acted, including, as identified above, the purpose for which the
challenged measure has been adopted. Climate-related regulatory purposes have yet to be
explicitly tested in investor-State arbitration, but appear ripe for such a challenge in
coming years.
4.Fair and equitable treatment
Nearly all modern IIAs guarantee that host countries will provide investors with
fair and equitable treatment (FET), which has arguably become “the most important
standard in investment disputes.”158 Like expropriation, the FET standard has been
contested by States and scholars over the course of many decades, with disagreements
raging about the appropriate relationship between the treaty-based FET obligation and the
international minimum standard of treatment under CIL,159 as well as about whether a
154
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due process standard constitutes an independent treaty norm or is subsumed within the
FET obligation.160 Further muddying the waters, arbitral tribunals have at times
considered the FET and non-expropriation obligations in tandem, concluding that certain
breaches of the FET standard can amount to indirect expropriation of investments.161
Despite real differences of opinion at the margins, the FET guarantee is generally
thought to include a set of basic investor protections, including commitments by the host
country to: (i) transparency, stability, and respect for investors’ legitimate expectations;
(ii) compliance with contractual obligations; (iii) procedural due process; (iv) good faith;
and, (v) freedom from coercion and harassment.162 The tribunal in Waste Management
(2004) articulated the standard as follows:
[T]he minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed
by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is
arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory or exposes the
claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading
to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case with a
manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of
transparency and candour [sic] in an administrative process. In applying this
standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations made by
the host State which were reasonably relied on by the claimant.163
Many subsequent tribunals have followed this general approach, while at the same time
stressing that FET must be judged on the basis of the facts of a particular case and not in
the abstract.164
From the perspective of climate policy, the most problematic part of the FET
standard is the requirement that a host country not undermine investors’ “legitimate
expectations.”165 Put plainly, the notion is that “it is unfair for a state to create certain
does not). Cf. Saluka Investments, supra note 153, para. 309 (holding that “the ‘fair and equitable treatment’
standard […] is an autonomous Treaty standard” unconnected to CIL). See also Biwater Gauff, supra note
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160
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expectations in the minds of investors through its laws, regulations, and actions; and then,
once the investment is made, to change those laws and regulations in ways that
significantly frustrate or cancel the expectations that the state itself has been instrumental
in creating.”166 Where new climate regulations impose the previously externalized costs
of GHG emissions upon investors, a claimant may allege that its “legitimate
expectations” have been violated.167 For while some degree of regulatory evolution is to
be expected (and, clearly, the FET obligation ought not be interpreted as stringently as
the requirements imposed by stabilization clauses),168 the difference between a regulatory
landscape where emissions are free and one with a price on carbon is arguably stark
enough to provide the basis for a successful FET claim. This issue is discussed in greater
depth in Part D.1 below.
5.National and/or most-favored-nation treatment
National treatment provisions require that host countries treat foreign investors no
less favorably than the host countries treat their own nationals.169 A close cousin of
national treatment, the most favored nation (MFN) clause included in many IIAs does not
guarantee equality of treatment between foreign and domestic investors, but rather
prohibits host countries from treating a covered foreign investor or an investment
originating from an IIA partner any less favorably than it treats investors or investments
from any other country.170 This means, in practice, that a foreign investor can invoke an
MFN clause to take advantage of the highest standard of treatment granted to the
nationals of any of the host country’s BIT partners. Some BITs, such as those negotiated
by the United States, combine the national treatment and MFN standards, requiring the
host country to grant foreign investors the more favorable of either national or MFN
treatment.171
Notably, certain aspects of the international climate regime might be
considered to violate the national treatment or MFN obligations in IIAs. An example can
be found in the language of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which states that CDM
projects can only be undertaken between developing countries and entities from
developed countries. This limitation on participation is facially discriminatory under
national treatment principles. Although no investor has yet brought a claim alleging that
this requirement under the Kyoto Protocol violates an IIA, such a claim theoretically
could be brought.172 Additionally, certain climate-friendly measures, including subsidies
or investment incentives (or the removal of subsidies or incentives for high carbon fossil
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fuels),173 might be interpreted to run afoul of national treatment and MFN provisions.
Thus, the commitments made at the G20’s 2009 Pittsburgh summit, not to mention
President Obama’s recent statements on fossil fuel subsidies in the 2012 federal budget,
might arguably conflict with certain interpretations of key features of the IIL regime,
making them ripe for challenge by an aggrieved investor.174
6.Umbrella clauses
Many IIAs contain so-called “umbrella clauses,” which raise contractual
violations and breaches of other obligations to investors to the level of treaty violations,
making the previously mentioned infringements actionable by investors before an
international arbitration tribunal rather than leaving the resolution of such disputes to
domestic courts.175 Sometimes couched in terms of a host country’s “observance of
obligations,”176 an umbrella clause is typically justified on the grounds that it ensures an
additional degree of contractual stability and therefore creates an environment more
favorable for foreign investment.177 Thus, such provisions generally stipulate that “[e]ach
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to the
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party.”178 However, this feature of IIAs
has been the subject of some controversy.
In twin decisions involving the same claimant (Switzerland-based Société
Générale de Surveillance (SGS)), two arbitral tribunals famously reached opposite
conclusions on the question of tribunal jurisdiction, pursuant to a BIT’s umbrella clause,
to hear an investor’s claim regarding host country breaches of investment contracts. In
SGS v. Pakistan (2003),179 the tribunal rejected the claimant’s arguments on textual and
policy grounds and, noting that this was the first time a tribunal had examined the legal
effect of an umbrella clause, upheld Pakistan’s objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.180
By contrast, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines (2004)181 held that the umbrella clause in
the Switzerland-Philippines BIT subsumed the contractual dispute in question
“notwithstanding the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favor of local trial
courts for such disputes.”182 Distinguishing the Pakistan decision on the basis of
differences in the wording of the clause in question183 and noting that it was not bound by
173
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any doctrine of precedent to follow the prior tribunal’s logic,184 the Philippines tribunal
read the clause broadly to cover the contractual dispute between the parties.185 Confusion
has persisted on the issue of umbrella clauses since the twin SGS cases were decided,
with many subsequent tribunals following the Philippines approach and looking closely
at the language of the clause in question in order to determine the scope of its coverage.
An additional complication in umbrella clause interpretation may emerge in cases
where investment contracts contain so-called “stabilization clauses.”186 Such clauses
operate to “‘freeze the law of the host state with respect to the investment project over the
life of the project’” or, less drastically, to “‘require that the investor be compensated for
the cost of complying with’” new laws introduced after the investment is made.187 Since a
stabilization clause may provide evidence of an investor’s “legitimate expectations”
concerning the investor’s investment,188 such a clause may allow the investor to bring an
IIA claim under either an FET obligation or an umbrella clause.189 Moreover, there is at
least some support for the proposition that breach of a stabilization clause can also
constitute an indirect expropriation.190 Claims involving breaches of stabilization clauses
have heretofore dealt with issues as diverse as taxation and human rights,191 and would
also appear ripe for a climate-related challenge.
C.Investment Oriented Trends in Climate Change Policy
As the international community grapples with a warming planet, a rough
consensus has emerged that any strategy to deal with climate change must not only limit
developed country emissions but also encourage low-carbon economic growth in the
developing world while at the same time helping particularly vulnerable countries and
regions adapt to adverse climate impacts. Each of these tasks features an investment
component; each task will therefore engage, to some degree, features of the IIL regime.
This Part itemizes existing climate policies that touch upon the IIL principles identified
observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by investor of the
other Contracting Party.”).
184
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above, while also highlighting new climate finance initiatives that, once operationalized,
may generate significant low-carbon FDI flows and therefore make use of key elements
of the IIL regime.
1.Existing Offset Measures
Existing climate policies already anticipate roles for transnational private sector
investment in low-carbon projects or facilities. Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol’s
flexibility mechanisms, for instance, private entities in Annex I countries may be
authorized to make investments in developing countries in order to lower the cost of
compliance with the investors’ home countries’ treaty-based emissions reduction
targets.192 Beyond the three market-based mechanisms authorized by the UNFCCC, many
developed countries have adopted or proposed to adopt offsetting measures in their
domestic ETS programs that allow or would allow covered facilities to purchase
international “credits” that can be credited towards compliance with a cap on GHG
emissions. Other schemes include forest conservation projects loosely coordinated under
the umbrella of REDD.
a.Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms allow market participants to invest
in certified emission reductions through a variety of channels, such as joint
implementation of efficiency and clean energy projects in Annex I countries (including
Russia and the former Soviet states) and the CDM, which enables financing of such
projects in developing countries where, but for the investment in question, greater
emissions would otherwise result.193 Both joint implementation and the CDM enable
home countries to credit transnational private investments toward their own national
emissions reduction targets for the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-12).
While joint implementation projects generate “emission reduction units” (ERUs),
investments in CDM projects yield “certified emission reductions” (CERs).194 Private
actors can use both types of credits to comply with domestic emission limits imposed by
governments pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, although ERUs currently trade at a discount
to CERs in the European carbon market, the world’s largest, because “fewer companies
have obtained internal management approval to buy them.”195
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Since it allows for projects to be undertaken across the entire developing world, as
opposed to just within Annex I parties, the CDM has far greater potential than joint
implementation to stimulate low-carbon FDI flows.196 The CDM has indeed attracted
significant investment, with over 2,900 transnational projects – worth billions of dollars –
registered as of March 2011.197 One recent study estimated that CDM projects initiated
since 2002 represent US$ 150 billion in investment, although not all of this constitutes
FDI since some project sponsors from major emerging economies have provided their
own financing.198 And with empirical evidence showing that the conclusion of BITs by
developing countries may fail to generate FDI flows, some argue that “the CDM is in fact
more effective than traditional IIAs in promoting investment.”199 Of course, since the
market for CDM-generated CERs is entirely contingent upon the binding obligation on
developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol to comply with their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments,200 any decision to invest is policy-dependent;
uncertainty about the future form of the CDM after the Kyoto Protocol’s expiry in 2012
has caused a significant dip in project activity.201
At the Cancún summit in December 2010, the COP took steps to reform and
strengthen governance of the CDM,202 while falling short of some parties’ proposals that
the CDM be linked to new instruments designed to stimulate FDI and deliver emission
reductions on a much larger scale.203 Reforming the CDM is necessary not just because
196
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under the terms of the Copenhagen Accord low-carbon FDI must increase fivefold by
2020,204 but also because real challenges remain in meeting the CDM’s twin goals of
emissions mitigation and sustainable development. Many observers have criticized the
CDM’s relatively lax governance structure and questioned the additionality of the CERs
issued as a result of CDM projects, calling into question the effectiveness of the scheme
to achieve real emission reductions.205
Furthermore, CDM projects have not been implemented evenly across developing
countries. Countries with relatively high levels of development have attracted the
majority of CDM projects, while least developed countries (LDCs) have hosted only a
few. Indeed, 70 percent of CDM projects registered to date have been located in just three
countries: China (41.2 percent), India (22.3 percent) and Brazil (7.1 percent). Only 1.9
percent of registered projects are in Africa, with South Africa leading the continent at
seventeen projects.206
Despite these obvious limitations, the CDM is nevertheless the lone Kyoto
Protocol mechanism to have generated significant low-carbon FDI flows. As such, some
commentators have suggested that it should serve as a model for a new breed of IIA that
expressly conditions favorable host country treatment or the provision of specific
investment incentives upon meeting a set of “climate friendly criteria” specified in the
IIA.207 This – together with other related proposals – is discussed in Part D below.
b.Emissions trading system (ETS) offsets
Under an ETS, emission allowances are typically allocated to regulated entities
such as industrial facilities, and these entities are allowed to engage in “emissions
trading” with others, thereby taking advantage of market efficiencies to find the most cost
effective sources of GHG emissions reductions continent-wide.208 The EU ETS and other
204
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national climate policy mechanisms with emissions trading components allow regulated
entities to credit the CERs they generate via CDM projects and the ERUs gained in joint
implementation projects to their respective emission caps. Although the value of these
and other proposed types of “offsets,” such as credits for REDD projects, can fluctuate
wildly depending upon the overall policy framework governing their use, offsets are an
important component of the EU ETS and may, depending on the future design of the
mechanism, generate significant flows of both public and private capital for low-carbon
energy projects in developing countries.209
National schemes such as the EU ETS can define emissions offsets in various
ways, including as a commodity, a security interest, or even in some cases a service.210
Depending on the legal character of the offset credit and whether it constitutes an
“investment” under the terms of an applicable IIA, the offsetting provisions of a national
ETS may trigger the investment protection mechanisms available to investors under IIL,
enabling the owners of offset credits to push back against regulatory measures that effect
or interfere with the offset credits’ use. Of course, whether or not the EU defines an offset
credit as an “investment” may not matter much if the investment is located in a country
that defines the credit differently. As of March 2011, only one international investment
arbitration concerning the legal status of emissions offset credits was known to have been
initiated. Oral hearings in the case, which involves the certification of ERUs by the
Government of Ukraine for use in the EU ETS by a Cypriot investor, were scheduled to
be held in early 2011 in The Hague.211 Much remains to be seen, as of this writing, about
how investors’ property interests in offset credits will or will not engage the norms and
standards of the IIL regime discussed above.
c.Reducing

Emissions
Degradation (REDD)

from

Deforestation

and

Forest

Tropical deforestation accounts for roughly one fifth of global anthropogenic
carbon emitted each year,212 yet until relatively recently policies aimed at reducing
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) were not formally included within
the UNFCCC system.213 Concerned with complicated questions of additionality and
the only jurisdiction to have established an ETS, but it represents the foremost exemplar of such a program
to date. As such, this subsection will focus exclusively on the European experience with offsets.
209
See Part C.2 infra.
210
See Louisa Fitz-Gerald and Paul Curnow, “Australia case study,” in Leslie Parker, Jennifer Ronk, and
Rachel Maxwell, eds., From debate to design: issues in clean energy and climate change law and policy
(New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 2008), p. 113. Notably, although the
European Union is clearly not a nation-State in the traditional Westphalian sense, the EU ETS functions
less like those regional arrangements discussed in Part A.2, supra, and more like a national-level regulatory
regime.
211
Peterson, “Tribunal declines interim measures request of investor: Claimant pursuing arbitration arising
out of Kyoto Protocol emission reduction project,” supra note 8.
212
See IPCC, “Fourth assessment report: Synthesis report” supra note 15.
213
Climate scientists have long been aware of the link between deforestation and carbon emissions, and
parties to the UNFCCC have held extensive discussions on forest carbon since the COP-11 summit in
Montreal in 2005, but the REDD policy framework was only formally introduced at COP-13 in 2007, as a
component of the Bali Action Plan. See UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.13 (Reducing emissions from
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unable to agree on standards for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of
avoided deforestation projects, negotiators chose to leave REDD outside of the original
Kyoto Protocol framework. But since the late 1990s, political and economic changes in
forest-rich countries like Brazil and Indonesia, together with advances in remote sensing
technology, have promised solutions to many of these problems.214 At COP-16 in
December 2010, REDD represented a rare area of relative consensus among developed
and developing countries,215 and parties to the Convention left Cancún with a formal,
albeit vague, agreement in hand on forest conservation and climate change.216
Even before COP-16, where REDD finally became legally operative under the
Kyoto Protocol, forest protection schemes have been fairly well integrated into the
international climate policy toolbox through the creative use of the CDM to finance
forestry projects,217 through multilateral funds such as the World Bank’s Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility,218 and through bilateral mechanisms like Norway’s International
Climate and Forest Initiative.219 The 2009 Copenhagen negotiations yielded a REDD
negotiating text that could stand alone, even in the absence of a deal on post-2012
emissions reduction commitments by developed countries.220 The United States, among

deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1,
March 14, 2008, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf (last visited April
30, 2011).
214
For comprehensive overview of these recent developments and key issues relating to implementation of
REDD, see Meridian Institute, “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD): An
options assessment report prepared for the Government of Norway,” March 2009, available at:
http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD-OAR_en.pdf (last visited April 30, 2011).
215
See Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), “REDD-plus briefing
paper: UN climate change conference in Cancun,” November 22, 2010, available at:
http://www.field.org.uk/files/fieldcancunreddplusbrief_en.pdf (last visited April 30, 2011).
216
For instance, the REDD agreement negotiated at COP-16 included no mention of carbon markets as a
mechanism to generate investment in avoided deforestation projects, casting some doubt on the potential
scope of the REDD program. See Jim Efstathiou Jr. and Alex Morales, “Climate talks back $100 billion aid
fund, forest protection; no Kyoto deal,” Bloomberg, December 11, 2010, available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-11/un-talks-endorse-100-billion-climate-aid-fund-forestprotection-program.html (last visited April 30, 2011). Other aspects of the REDD text were purposefully
left ambiguous so that future negotiators can work to improve the agreement. See Nathan Hultman, “The
Cancun Agreements on climate change,” The Brookings Institution, December 14, 2010, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1214_climate_hultman.aspx (last visited April 30, 2011) (“The
agreements merely provide the framework and do not obligate any country to specific reductions. The hope
is that future multi- or bilateral agreements could arise as a result of the more formalized REDD process
imitated [sic] under the Cancun Agreements, but as of now this potential remains an open question.”).
217
In March 2010 the World Bank announced the registration of Africa’s first large-scale forest CDM
project, which followed on the heels of other forestry-related CDM projects in other regions. See World
Bank, Press Release, “Africa’s First Large-Scale Forestry Project Under the Kyoto Protocol,” March 3,
2010, available at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22487653~pagePK:34370~piPK:
34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited April 30, 2011).
218
See infra note 234.
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See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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UNFCCC negotiating text, UN Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8 (May 19, 2009), available at:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/08.pdf (last visited April 30, 2011).
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others, favored this approach in Cancún.221 Bolivia, on the other hand, lead a coalition of
developing countries to demand that any REDD agreement reflect the outcome of a
“People’s Climate Conference” held in Cochabamba earlier in 2010,222 which called for
enhanced social safeguards and limits on financing for REDD though offsets. A key
challenge for Cancún negotiators was thus to incorporate some of these demands while
maintaining support from developed countries, for which forest-based offsetting remains
essential. Although the REDD agreement reached in Cancún left many details to be
determined at the next COP, to be held in South Africa in December 2011, it provided
enough certainty to all but guarantee large investment inflows to forest-rich developing
countries for the foreseeable future. While the majority of current REDD projects rely
upon public rather than private investment, future private sector forest carbon
investments will necessarily involve both municipal and national land use regulations and
delicate negotiations with local forest-dependent communities, and are thus likely to
generate investment disputes under applicable IIAs. To the extent today’s pilot projects
generate significant attention from investors, REDD represents a key policy area where
climate measures and the IIL regime will interact, both positively and negatively, for the
foreseeable future.
2.The International Climate Finance Framework
Financial flows to developing countries for climate change mitigation and
adaptation purposes, from both public and private sources, totaled approximately US$ 9
billion in 2009.223 Yet a rough consensus holds that developing countries will face
ongoing climate-related costs at least ten times higher per annum.224 Reflecting this view,
the international community concluded the Copenhagen Accord in December 2009. The
Accord included new financial commitments by developed countries to “provide new and
additional resources ... approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012 with
balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation” (dubbed the “fast-start” financing
commitment)225 and to “mobiliz[e] jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to
221

Alex Ogle, “Obama pointman dismisses climate change skeptics,” Agence France Presse, November
18, 2010 (“With a dimmed prospect of a path-breaking deal there, efforts have shifted towards more
modest and incremental steps. Stern backed such steps on Thursday, saying the summit would focus on
smaller and more achievable initiatives to address deforestation, financing and technology transfer […]”).
222
The World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was held in
Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2010. The Conference yielded a “Peoples’ Agreement,” which articulated
many of the most strident developing country critiques of the Copenhagen Accord. See World People’s
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, available at:
http://pwccc.wordpress.com/support (last visited April 30, 2011).
223
World Bank, “Issue brief: Making the most of public finance for climate action,” May 2010, p. 2,
available at:
http://climatechange.worldbank.org/climatechange/sites/default/files/documents/DCFIB%20%232-web.pdf
(last visited May, 27, 2011).
224
See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, “Post-2012 policy brief: Strengthening international climate
finance,” p. 3, available at: http://www.pewclimate.org/publications/brief/strengthening-internationalclimate-finance (last visited April 30, 2011).
225
For an analysis of these “fast-start” commitments as of November 2010, see World Resources Institute,
“Summary of developed country ‘fast-start’ climate finance pledges,” available at:
http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges (last
visited April 30, 2011).
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address the needs of developing countries.”226 The Accord clarified that “[t]his funding
will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral,
including alternative sources of finance.”227
To facilitate the mobilization of these new financial commitments, parties
established the architecture for a multilateral “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” to
“support projects, programme [sic], policies and other activities in developing countries
related to mitigation.”228 In Cancún, parties formally established this “Green Climate
Fund,” which is to operate under the “guidance” of the COP. The parties created a
twenty-four-member board to govern the new fund, with equal representation from
developed and developing countries. The Cancún Agreements also designated the World
Bank as interim trustee; the Bank’s role will be reviewed three years after the fund begins
operating.229
Pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord, which called for the creation of a “High
Level Panel ... to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including
alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal,”230 UN Secretary-General Banki Moon established the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing
(AGF) in February of 2010.231 Co-chaired by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, the AGF was given a mandate to study
and issue a report on “potential sources of revenue for the scaling up of new and
additional resources from developed countries for financing actions in developing
countries, in the spirit of the political commitments contained in the Copenhagen Accord,
with a view to contributing to an appropriate decision of the UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties at its 16th session in Mexico.” The AGF’s final report, published on November 5,
2010, represents one of the most authoritative sources of information to date about the
international community’s views on climate finance. Predictably, it identifies multiple
potential sources of revenue to meet the goals established by the Copenhagen Accord,
including both public and private sources, 232 while carefully eschewing all but the most
general recommendations.
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a.Public financing
Only 40 percent of financing for climate mitigation projects in developing
countries consists of public funds.233 Currently, this public financing flows either through
unilateral official development assistance (ODA) programs or through channels
established by the UNFCCC. Under the Convention, an independent financial
organization known as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) distributes multilateral
financing to developing countries,234 but parties at COP-15 agreed to establish a single
entity to coordinate future actions on climate finance. To this end, they called for the
AGF to examine both sources and structures for managing new financial flows, with an
eye towards adopting the AGF’s recommendations at COP-16 in December 2010. The
Cancún Agreements, in large measure, incorporate the AGF’s core structure and policy
prescriptions.
According to the AGF final report, “[n]ew public sources ... have the potential to
generate flows of tens of billions of dollars annually, a significant step towards raising
the US$100 billion per year” by 2020 called for by the Copenhagen Accord.235 The AGF
identified ten potential sources of public financing:
1. International auctioning of emission allowances under the Kyoto Protocol;
2. Auctioning of emission allowances in domestic emissions trading schemes, as
under Phase III of the EU ETS;
3. Offset levies, such as those generated by the CDM;
4. Taxes on international aviation and/or shipping, involving a levy on maritime
bunker/aviation jet fuels, a separate emissions trading scheme for these
activities or a surcharge on passenger tickets for international flights;
5. A small charge on electricity generation, either on kWh produced or on the
carbon emissions per kWh produced;
6. Revenues generated by removing fossil energy subsidies in developed
countries, which can be diverted towards climate finance;
7. Revenues from fossil fuel extraction royalties or licenses:
8. Carbon taxes;
9. A global financial transaction tax (also known as a “Tobin tax”); or
10.
Direct budget contributions.236
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Crucially, the AGF acknowledged practical difficulties associated with many of
these public sources of funding. These range from political infeasibility in the case of
carbon taxes and direct budget contributions to the relatively small scale of revenue
generated from the removal of fossil fuel subsidies.237 To overcome these difficulties, the
AGF recommended leveraging public funds and carbon market offsets to generate private
financial flows, with revenue potential estimated to be “up to US$500 billion in 2020” on
the basis of a “leverage factor of between 2 and 4 on public flows.”238 The Cancún
Agreements, although falling short of establishing specific pathways to reach the
Copenhagen Accord’s stated goal of US$ 100 billion per year, ratifies the AGF’s general
approach of leveraging public capital to mobilize private sector financial flows.
b.Mobilizing private investment
Leveraging public financing to stimulate low-carbon private investment has
become the preferred means by which developed countries aim to meet their goal of US$
100 billion in annual climate finance by 2020. A recent International Energy Agency
report on energy efficiency aptly characterizes the ultimate climate finance goal as
“government policies that can trigger a sustainable virtuous circle of [clean energy]
investments” by the private sector.239 Similarly, the AGF final report stated that “the
potentially large scale of private flows could be essential for the transition to a lowcarbon world,” but cautions that “many low-carbon technologies still present higher costs
than the high-carbon alternatives,” meaning that “private capital will be mobilized only
with sufficient public finance.”240 This public finance may of course take a variety of
forms, including direct subsidies and loan guarantees,241 but private investment will
always depend fundamentally on the risk-return ratio for a given project. Crucially, part
of this ratio is determined, as the AGF pointed out, by the “investment climates in
developing countries,” meaning the legal and regulatory frameworks governing the entry
and treatment of low-carbon FDI.
Following the publication of the AGF final report, the United Kingdom
Department for International Development (DFID) announced that the country was
launching two initiatives, consisting of public-private initiatives, to finance clean energy
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projects in developing countries.242 The DFID announcement, made just weeks before
COP-16 talks began in Mexico, was widely hailed as a prelude to further commitments
from developed countries on climate finance. The DFID announcement emphasized the
important leveraging role public finance must play in providing incentives and reducing
risks for private investors in low-carbon development projects,243 articulating a growing
consensus concerning the importance of mobilizing low-carbon FDI in the developing
world.244 As this chapter was submitted for publication it was still too soon to reach
conclusions about whether or not carefully crafted public incentives can indeed catalyze
vast new flows of private investment in low-carbon energy and development projects.
Researchers are no doubt already busy examining preliminary data, and will likely
continue to study the topic for some time to come. The question here, then, becomes
whether IIL will help, hinder or have no effect at all on such flows.
D.Rethinking International Investment Law
The reformation of the IIL regime is well underway. Responding to criticism
from non-governmental organizations, international law scholars and even developing
country governments,245 developed countries such as the United States have begun to
reassess the general policy objectives of their extant IIAs, review their model BITs, and
reexamine the specific treaty language currently under negotiation in bilateral and
multilateral fora.246 Developing countries too are reevaluating their policies, renegotiating
and, in some cases, terminating specific IIAs that they determine no longer serve their
national policy objectives.247 In all, UNCTAD’s 2010 World Investment Report counted
242
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sixteen countries which have revised or are currently revising their model BITs.248 The
cumulative results of these reassessments, although still preliminary, indicate a growing
recognition that IIAs must reflect countries’ social and environmental goals as well as
their need to foster sustainable economic growth through foreign investment. Building
upon an already well-established trend, many recently concluded IIAs thus contain
“certain innovative features aimed at rebalancing the agreements between the rights and
obligations of investors and host countries, as well as between economic and other public
policy objectives, such as the protection of the environment.”249 Whether explicitly stated
or not, these goals certainly include climate mitigation and adaptation.
Climate-friendly provisions in IIAs can take two forms. First, IIAs can be
modified to preserve host country flexibility in promulgating climate regulations.250
Second, countries can make use of new and existing provisions in IIAs to incentivize
low-carbon FDI flows. This Part addresses each of these approaches in turn.
1.Preserving Flexibility for Climate Regulations
International investment law is changing as states renegotiate existing IIAs and
adopt new treaties. Such modifications, some of which are reflected in certain recently
concluded IIAs, include narrowing the definition of an indirect expropriation so that
limits on GHG emissions are not deemed to violate a host country’s treaty obligations.
Likewise, climate-friendly changes to IIAs can include more explicit definitions of vague
standards such as FET and MFN/national treatment. A related but conceptually distinct
approach involves the creation of climate-specific carve outs, either through introducing
new categories of exceptions to which an IIA will not apply or through effectively
removing certain types of disputes from the scope of an ISDS clause by, for instance,
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies by an investor prior to availing oneself of
international arbitration.
a.Narrowing the definition of indirect expropriation
The 2004 United States Model BIT restricts the scope of cognizable indirect
expropriation claims by indicating that, as under U.S. constitutional law, nondiscriminatory regulations to protect public welfare do not constitute expropriations
“except in rare circumstances.”251 This restriction, which follows the logic of arbitral
awards such as Methanex and Saluka,252 is clearly a step in the right direction in terms of
protecting host country flexibility for climate-friendly regulations. Still, the model BIT
248
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provides no guidance as to what might constitute such “rare circumstances.”253 Learning
from this, the 2004 Canadian Model BIT goes further, providing that, “Except in rare
circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in light of
their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied
in good faith […].”254
Both the U.S. and Canadian Model BITs go a long way towards alleviating
concerns that climate-friendly regulations, such as those challenged in the German
Vatenfall arbitration,255 might be held to violate the terms of an investment treaty. The
2007 Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) goes further, distinguishing between a compensable indirect expropriation
and the adverse effects endured by a foreign investor as a result of “bona fide regulatory
measures [...] that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment.”256 This provision
makes it clear, in a way that the U.S. and Canadian models do not, that a host country’s
measures to protect the climate will not run afoul of its IIA obligations.
A different approach, utilized in the context of intellectual property but quite
relevant to the issue of climate change, can be found in Article 10.8(5) of the MalaysiaNew Zealand FTA (2009).257 That clause creates an explicit exception to the treaty’s
expropriation obligation for the issuance of “compulsory licenses granted in relation to
intellectual property (IP) rights in accordance with the WTO TRIPS Agreement.”258
Much like IP licenses granted pursuant to TRIPS, a country may implement its climate
change obligations under the UNFCCC in such a way as to require investors to purchase
and hold GHG emissions permits.259 Taking a cue from the Malaysia-New Zealand FTA,
future IIAs might create specific carve outs under the expropriation, MFN, national
treatment, or FET headings, for such permits.260
b.Clarifying FET and MFN/national treatment standards
Seeking to avoid excessive liability under overly broad interpretations of the FET
standard, some countries have entirely excluded the FET clause from their recently
concluded IIAs.261 A less extreme option involves explicitly linking the FET standard to
253
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the minimum standard of treatment under CIL.262 Countries can make this linkage not
only by referring to CIL explicitly in the FET provision of a treaty, but also by drafting
binding interpretive statements clarifying the meaning of the obligation. This occurred
most famously in 2001 when the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued a
binding interpretation under Article 1131(2), which clarified that the FET obligation in
Article 1105 is coextensive with the international minimum standard under CIL.263
Restricting FET to the narrow CIL standard, which arbitrators have generally agreed
applies only to “egregious” or “outrageous” conduct by a host country,264 clearly ensures
that many climate-friendly regulations will pass muster under an applicable IIA.
However, the FET standard can be clarified in other ways as well. For instance,
following EDF v. Romania (2009),265 an IIA might address the issue of “legitimate
expectations” by giving the concept a more precise definition than what has typically
been read into FET.266 This clarification would have the salutary effect of blocking
investor claims that arise from a changed regulatory landscape (such as would occur
following the imposition of climate-friendly measures) while not going so far as to
preclude FET claims that do not reach the level of egregiousness required under the CILonly approach endorsed by the NAFTA FTC.
Furthermore, clarifying the FET standard to anticipate certain “legitimate
expectations” claims could be particularly beneficial as states seek to create stable and
predictable policy frameworks to incentivize clean energy investment. At present,
countries that have imposed or considered imposing a price on carbon emissions are
under tremendous pressure to renege on such innovations.267 As in the case of the annual
renewal of subsidies for renewable energy, uncertainty about future market conditions
can stultify low-carbon growth as investors take a wait-and-see approach to all but the
most profitable investments.268 A less ambiguous FET standard in future IIAs, if drafted
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properly, might in fact be able to split the difference between those “legitimate
expectations” claims with the potential to undermine climate-friendly regulatory
measures and those likely to result from a host country’s failure to maintain policies
necessary to safeguard low-carbon investments.
Regarding MFN and national treatment, similar clarifications can help protect
host country regulatory flexibility on climate. A “plain vanilla” MFN clause guarantees
to all foreign investors the most favorable treatment a host country has ever granted to
investors of any foreign country with which an IIA has been concluded. Because of this,
a host country may find that climate-friendly provisions in newer IIAs are nullified by
other IIAs, now or in the future, that do not contain such elements. Furthermore, a broad
MFN clause may preclude a host country from differentiating between incoming FDI on
the basis of, for instance, whether an investor’s home country has imposed a price on
carbon emissions. Such differentiation may be an important component of national
climate policies,269 making restrictions on the scope of the MFN and national treatment
obligations quite desirable.
Another simple measure might preclude investors from using an MFN clause to
“import” into their disputes certain substantive or procedural protections from other IIAs.
Both the Ethiopia-United Kingdom BIT (2009) and the ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement (2009), for example, clarify that the MFN obligation does not encompass
ISDS provisions from IIAs with third countries, making it harder for an investor to
“import” the ability to circumvent local remedies.270 This is particularly relevant in cases
where a host country may choose to require exhaustion of local remedies in climaterelated disputes prior to gaining access to international arbitration.271
In the case of national treatment, one additional option would be for a host
country to establish a “non-exhaustive list of criteria for tribunals to consider when
applying the national treatment standard.”272 The COMESA Investment Agreement, for
example, states that:
[E]ach Member State shall accord to COMESA investors and their investments
treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own investors and to their investments […] For greater certainty, references
to ‘like circumstances’ in paragraph 1 of this Article requires [sic] an overall
269
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examination on a case by case basis of all the circumstances of an investment
including, inter alia: [...] its effects on the local, regional or national environment,
including the cumulative effects of all investments within a jurisdiction on the
environment.273
The use of such an enumerated list cabins the discretion of arbitrators to find national
treatment violations in host country climate regulations, while stopping short of creating
an outright exemption to the general national treatment obligation. Such exemptions and
carve outs, however, may have a place in future IIAs dealing specifically with climate
change policy.
c.Climate-specific exemptions
Aside from the definitional changes identified above, countries are preserving
regulatory flexibility for their climate policy objectives by including general exceptions
clauses in IIAs. The India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
(CEPA) (2009), for example, includes an exceptions clause that specifies measures
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”274
Notably, this language closely mirrors that of GATT Article XX, the general exceptions
clause applicable in certain parts of the international trade law regime.275 While debate is
raging about whether and how GATT-specific standards, including exceptions, may be
“imported” into the IIL regime or referenced therein,276 it seems clear that the approach
taken by the India-Korea CEPA is a legitimate mechanism available to states by which to
exempt certain regulatory activities from a host country’s investment law obligations.
Short of a general exceptions clause, a host country can also create narrower
climate-specific exceptions for certain types of regulatory activities. UNCTAD points out
that such a clause could be modeled after the exceptions for “legitimate public policies”
in the Canada-Chile FTA (1996), the United States-Republic of Korea FTA (2007), and
the United States-Singapore FTA (2003).277 By explicitly enumerating a set of climaterelated measures that constitute legitimate public policies, a narrow exceptions clause
could help to stabilize IIL. Another option, discussed above, would be for a host country
to create a carve out from ISDS, national treatment or other substantive obligations for
climate change measures, as under the Belgium-Colombia BIT (2009)278 and the
COMESA investment agreement, respectively.279 All of these exceptions and carve outs,
273
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of course, push back somewhat against the pro-investment orientation of traditional IIAs,
making it easier for host countries to take actions which negatively impact foreign
investors. IIAs can also be modified, however, with features designed to affirmatively
incentivize climate-friendly investments.
2.Incentivizing Low-Carbon FDI Flows
The second category of climate-friendly IIA modification involves not the
preservation of a host country’s ability to impose regulations on foreign investors but
rather, in the words of UNCTAD’s 2010 World Investment Report, “leveraging foreign
investment for a low-carbon economy.”280 Of course, there are myriad ways to
incentivize climate-friendly FDI flows, many of which have very little to do with IIL.
This section focuses on several of the ways in which new IIAs are being utilized to help
ramp up cross border investments in low-carbon projects.
a.Changes to preambular language
Preambular language is often used to determine the content and scope of a given
treaty’s “object and purpose.”281 In cases where an ambiguous provision can be
interpreted to impose an added obligation on a host country, narrow, pro-investment
preambles have often led tribunals to find that a treaty’s object and purpose require the
resolution of disputes in favor of investors, even where challenged host country measures
sought to achieve justifiable public policy objectives.282 In order to ensure that preambles
are used to uphold – rather than undermine – other legitimate regulatory aims, many
countries are now making changes to preambular language in new IIAs. Thus,
UNCTAD’s 2010 World Investment Report highlights the possibility that preambular
language can be drafted to affirm that “IIAs and attendant FDI flows aim to help address
the climate change challenge.”283
Beyond the simple mention of environmental objectives in a preamble, as in the
2004 United States Model BIT284 or the 2009 Japan-Swiss FTA,285 IIAs can go much
further towards harmonizing climate change mitigation objectives and the strictures of
investment law. The ECT, for instance, specifically refers to the UNFCCC in its
preamble:
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Recalling the [UNFCCC], the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and its protocols, and other international environmental agreements with
energy-related aspects; and [r]ecognizing the increasingly urgent need for
measures to protect the environment, [...].286
The inclusion of such a reference indicates the intent of the parties to harmonize, to the
extent possible, their commitments under the UNFCCC and those undertaken herein.
Thus, any tribunal attempting to resolve a future investment dispute involving a measure
taken pursuant to an UNFCCC obligation would be able to say with much greater
certainty that the parties intended the ECT to help achieve the goals of the UNFCCC, not
stymie them.
The 2007 Norwegian Model BIT, although criticized for going too far in the
direction of preserving host country flexibility, utilizes aspects of both the U.S. and ECT
formulations while building upon them in a novel way, stating not only that the treaty’s
objectives should be achieved “in a manner consistent with the protection of health,
safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labour
rights,” but also that “the provisions of this agreement and provisions of international
agreements relating to the environment shall be interpreted in a mutually supportive
manner.”287
Other proposed changes to preambular language, although not adopted by any
IIAs, go one step further. One suggestion, for instance, would have countries lift text
directly from the UNFCCC itself and add it to the text of a BIT.288 By replicating the
precise language of the UNFCCC’s preamble, this would not only serve to underscore the
import climate-oriented objectives of the investment treaty, but would also avoid any
ambiguities in meaning, making it harder for investor-claimants to prevail on challenges
to climate-friendly regulatory measures.
b.Low-carbon performance requirements
Although hitherto disfavored in the IIL regime, the inclusion of certain
performance requirements in IIAs could help host countries ensure that incoming FDI
flows generate climate change benefits, such as the transfer of clean energy technologies.
Japan has been a leader in this regard. Both the Japan-Swiss FTA (2009) and the BruneiJapan FTA (2009) contain provisions for the promotion of trade in environmental
products and services. The Japan-Swiss FTA, for instance, states that:
The Parties shall encourage trade and dissemination of environmental products
and environment-related services in order to facilitate access to technologies and
286
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products that support the environmental protection and development goals, such
as improved sanitation, pollution prevention, sustainable promotion of renewable
energy and climate-change-related goals.289
Notably, this obligation is vaguely worded and is not located in the investment chapter of
the agreement. Problematically, the treaty includes a flat prohibition on performance
requirements in Article 96, which incorporates, mutatis mutandis, Annex 1A of the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).290 This makes the
encouragement (let alone requirement) of clean technology transfers much less feasible.
As UNCTAD argues, however, IIAs might include such features in their
investment chapters and, possibly, accompanying carve outs from the prohibition on
performance requirements.291 Besides specific obligations related to technology transfer,
other low-carbon performance requirements might call for investors to engage in capacity
building for local communities. Especially in the case of investments in the forestry
sector under REDD, the training and involvement of communities is instrumental in
ensuring the integrity of avoided deforestation emission credits.292 Narrowly defined
performance requirements in IIAs may thus serve to strengthen any future REDD regime.
c.New home country obligations
The IIL regime has traditionally been oriented to restrain host country
governments and protect foreign investors, not to impose affirmative obligations on these
investors’ home countries. As global investment flows become increasingly
multidirectional, however, such distinctions are breaking down, leading developed and
developing countries to seek to rebalance their foreign investment policies.293 One way to
do this would be to strengthen provisions in IIAs that have hitherto been merely hortatory
in order to impose new, binding obligations on home countries. These obligations might
include, inter alia, provisions on “investment promotion” that specifically focus on lowcarbon investments or provisions on technology transfer that specifically refer to clean
energy technologies.294
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Particularly in light of the enormous subsidies granted by developed country
governments to high-carbon industries, including to fossil fuel exports and fossil fueloriented FDI,295 and taking into account the G20’s commitment to phase out such
subsidies,296 the imposition of new host country obligations in IIAs related to incentives
for climate friendly investment seem eminently reasonable. The European Commission’s
July 2010 Communication on international investment policy, although largely silent on
this issue, did include one notable reference to the home country (and investor)
obligations:
A common investment policy should also be guided by the principles and
objectives of the Union’s external action more generally, including the promotion
of the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development (Article 205 TFEU
and Article 21 TEU). In this respect, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, which are currently being updated, are an important instrument to
help balance the rights and responsibilities of investors.297
While the inclusion of this reference in the Communication does not lock the European
Union into any specific language on home country obligations, it is telling that the
world’s largest economic union is considering reorienting its investment policy in this
direction.
Low-carbon investment promotion incentives are relatively simple measures and
could be easily included in future IIAs. Much more controversial are additional
substantive standards relating to specific actions to be undertaken by home country
governments. Some NGOs and scholars have proposed a range of new obligations in this
regard,298 while UNCTAD has cited as a key example the Cotonou Agreement between
the European Union and ACP Countries.299

295

For an excellent analysis of the difficulties facing the Export-Import Bank, the United States export
credit agency, in scaling back support for fossil fuels while ramping up low-carbon exports, see United
States Government Accountability Office, report to Congressional committees, “Export-Import Bank:
reaching new targets for environmentally beneficial exports presents major challenges for bank,” July 2010,
GAO-10-682, available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-682 (last visited April 30, 2011).
296
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
297
European Commission communication, supra note 14, art. 3(c).
298
See Muchlinski, “The framework of investment protection: the content of BITs,” supra note 132, p. 65
(citing both UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2003 and the Model international agreement for
sustainable development, published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development). For a farreaching discussion of the challenges of imposing home country obligations, see generally Christen
Broecker, “‘Better the devil you know’: home state approaches to transnational corporate accountability,”
41 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 159 (2008).
299
Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of
the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (Cotonou Agreement)
(concluded 23 June 2000, entered into force 1 April 2003), ACP/CE/en 1, available at:
http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf (last visited April 30, 2011).

51

6/03/2011

Firger & Gerrard

Conclusion: Harmonizing Climate and Investment Law
Policies undertaken to combat climate change are increasingly oriented towards
the mobilization of low-carbon forms of FDI, such as renewable energy projects and
tropical forest conservation schemes. International investment agreements are being
renegotiated and amended to include new protections for host country environmental
regulations and incentives for climate-friendly investments. The conventional wisdom on
climate policy and international investment law holds that conflict between the two
regimes is largely inevitable, as the imperative to regulate GHG emissions cannot be
squared with obligations such as the requirement to guarantee fair and equitable treatment
to foreign investors and the protection of their investments from expropriation. Yet the
conventional wisdom is wrong. Trends in climate policy – especially those related to
climate finance and technology transfer – highlight the importance of FDI in solving the
climate conundrum, while IIAs are undergoing significant transformation to better reflect
the balance between investor rights and the need for host countries to maintain flexibility
in promoting public welfare, including through specific actions taken to mitigate and
adapt to climate change.
The principle of “systemic integration,” distilled from Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is instructive here.300 In those cases where a
party to an IIA is also a party to the Kyoto Protocol or another international
environmental agreement, Article 31(3)(c) can provide a guide for a tribunal’s decisionmaking process. By requiring the tribunal to take into account “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties,” Article 31 makes it less
likely that a tribunal will find a climate regulation taken pursuant to Kyoto a violation of
an IIA. As explained throughout this chapter, however, many important elements of the
“regime complex” for climate are not subject to international treaties and therefore are
not covered by the Vienna Convention’s rules of interpretation. These climate measures
are taken bilaterally, regionally, nationally or sub-nationally, and feature the involvement
of private investment in lieu of – or in addition to – public governmental action. As a rule
of decision, “systemic integration” is a rather weak standard by which to resolve conflicts
between climate regulations and IIA obligations. Fortunately, developments in both areas
are generating a form of “bottom up” integration across regimes. Those shaping climate
policies and renegotiating BITs would do well to take note.
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